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ABSTRACT

When World war II began in September 1939, polls
indicated that most Americans believed it did not pose a
threat to the United States and opposed any involvement by a
ratio of 27-to-1.
President Franklin Roosevelt perceived that the power
of Nazi Germany and its ideals posed a threat to American
democracy.

He presented the war to the American public as a

moral struggle as well as one for security.

The President

publicized this view most notably in his Four Freedoms
speech and in the Atlantic Charter.

Both statements defined

the moral goals of basic human freedoms and national selfdejtermination.
Most Americans embraced the moral goals of the war when
the United States went to war in December 1941.

Those goals

were challenged when American forces under General Dwight D.
Eisenhower invaded French North Africa on November 8, 1942.
French North Africa was then controlled by the quasi-fascist
French government located in Vichy.

To save lives, and to

speed conquest of the area, Eisenhower secured the surrender
of the French forces from Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, a
Vichy official.

Darlan's fascist background seemed to

contradict Roosevelt's moral crusade.
News of the "Darlan Deal" provoked a public outcry.
Dozens of editorials appeared in American and British

newspapers criticizing Eisenhower's action.

Most of these

editorials argued that deals with fascists violated the
moral basis for the war.

Other fascists, it seemed, might

also be accommodated in the future.

Eisenhower was also

accused of betraying the Free French, under General Charles
de Gaulle, who had challenged Vichy for the loyalty of the
French people.
Roosevelt attempted to quiet criticism by referring to
Darlan as a "temporary expedient" who would ultimately
answer to the French people.

This explanation met temporary

acceptance, but skepticism increased as time passed.
Darlan's assassination on December 24, 1942 allowed
Roosevelt to renew the Allied commitment to destroying
fascism.

The Darlan Deal played a large role in Roosevelt's

pledge to accept nothing less than Unconditional Surrender
from the Axis powers at the Casablanca Conference in January
1943.
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CHAPTER I
FORMING AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

What drives nations to war-and what stirs the general
public to strong support of an armed conflict that may not
even directly affect them?
In World War II, moral indignation proved the defining
factor in keeping public support of the Allied cause strong.
Even before the United States entered the war in 1941,
American political leaders framed the conflict as one of
great moral significance: Nazism and fascism versus
individual rights; totalitarian states versus democratic
nations; good versus evil.
With the war cast in this light, the political and
military figures of the time came to symbolize their
respective causes.

Hitler became the embodiment of evil,

personifying totalitarianism and fascism; Churchill and
Roosevelt became the embodiments of liberty and democracy.
Even less significant figures received this treatment.
According to the Allied propaganda, Admiral Jean Fran~ois
Darlan, a minister in the semi-fascist Vichy French regime,
was a betrayer of democracy for the policies he endorsed.
Darlan proved unable to escape this portrayal, even after he
came over to the Allied side in November 1942.
Why frame the war in this manner?

Both the Allied and

Axis sides used rhetoric to mold public opinion in favor of

2

their side of the war.

People are more apt to support a

moral and just cause than one of outright aggression. So, to
earn public support, the Allies needed public opinion on
their side.
This was no easy task for United States President
Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The American public at the outset of

World War II did not support the United States' entry into
another armed conflict in Europe, especially one fought only
for personal or national gain. After world war I, a definite
isolationist sentiment captured America.

Fearing that the

League of Nations Covenant would drag the United States into
future foreign conflicts, the Senate failed to ratify it.
This isolationist sentiment continued to pervade American
public opinion throughout the period between the wars.

This

sentiment was deepened by the findings of the "Nye
Committee."

In 1934, the United States Senate formed the

Special Committee Investigating the Munitions Industry,
headed by Senator Gerald P. Nye, to uncover the economic
roots of world war I. 1

After reviewing corporate and

government files and listening to hours of testimony from
business leaders, the committee reported that the munitions
industry, seeing the potential for large profits, had
lobbied for and promoted America's entrance into World war

Wayne s. Cole, Senator Gerald P. Nye and American
Foreign Relations (Minneapolis: university of Minnesota
Press, 1962), 66.
1

3

I.

This pursuit of profits, the Nye Committee claimed, was

a primary cause for war. 2

By focusing on the economic

aspects of war, the Nye Committee reinforced the public's
belief that war allowed a minority of individuals to profit
at the expense of the majority.
President Franklin Roosevelt attempted to move American
public opinion from its opposition to military force in a
speech he delivered on October 5, 1937.

In his speech, the

president sought to convince the American public that force
could actually be used to enhance world peace.

The "peace-

loving nations must mete a concerted effort in opposition to
those ... creating a state of international anarchy and
instability from which there is no escape through mere
isolation or neutrality."

Roosevelt proposed that aggressor

nations be placed in a form of "quarantine." 3
The response of the American public was not what
Roosevelt had hoped for.

The Catholic Association for

International Peace supported the quarantine approach, but
claimed the policy "need not, and in our opinion, must not
mean war."

The American Federation of Labor also endorsed

Roosevelt's speech, but at the same time it declared its
opposition to American involvement in "European or Asiatic

2

3

Ibid., 95-96.

Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign
American Policy, 1932-1941 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979), 148.

4

wars."

American newspapers also supported the quarantine

proposal, as long as "these actions would not lead to
war ... " 4
Despite Roosevelt's efforts, he could not shake the
American public's anti-war sentiment.

A November 8, 1939

Gallup Poll indicated that 68 percent of Americans felt that
American involvement in World war I had been a mistake. 5

By

the early 1940s, this anti-war sentiment had begun to give
life to various isolationist groups, whose goal was to keep
the United States out of World war II.

These groups, such

as the America First Committee, the Keep America Out of war
Committee, and the Women's International League for Peace
and Freedom, justified their stance by citing public opinion
polls that showed the majority of the American public was
opposed to the United States entry into the war. 6
For example, a December 8, 1939 Gallup poll indicated
that Americans opposed entry into World war II by a margin
of 27-to-l. 7

Although the degree of the public's resistance

to entering the war would change over the years, the vast
majority of Americans remained opposed to entering the
4

Ibid., 151.
American Institute of Public Opinion (The Gallup
Poll), Gallup Poll Reports: 1935-1968 (Princeton, NJ:
American Institute of Public Opinion, 1969), 104.
6
Wayne s. Cole, America First: The Battle Against
Intervention 1940-1941 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1953), 53.
7
Gallup Poll Reports, 105.
5

5

conflict.

A May 29, 1940 Gallup Poll showed that although

more Americans now favored entering World War II than in
earlier polls, those opposed to U.S. involvement outnumbered
those favoring war by a margin of 13-to-l. 8
The German defeat of France in June 1940 seemed to
further justify the isolationist attitude.

France, widely

considered to have the strongest army in the world,
certainly had the strongest in Europe. The French had
fielded the largest Allied contingent in World war I and one
of France's most famous generals of that war, Marshal Henri
Petain, continued to wield political and military
influence. 9

A Gallup Poll conducted in America on October

13, 1940, after the French defeat, showed that 83 percent of
those planning to vote in the upcoming U.S. elections in
November opposed involvement in the war. 10
What the American public failed to realize, however, was
that fascism's aggressive tendencies posed a threat to the
united States.

Adolf Hitler, in particular, planned to

eventually fight a war with the United States.

Although his

opinions changed over time, Hitler always viewed the United
States as a future adversary.

8

In the 1920s, Hitler's

Gallup Poll Reports, 110.
Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global
History of World war II {Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994), 84.
10
Gallup Poll Reports, 115.
9

6

statements indicated that he viewed the United States as a
nation that maintained a pure Nordic racial makeup through
an essentially racist immigration policy.

With vast

available living area and resources, the American racial
stock posed a real threat to Germany superiority.

One of

the goals of National Socialism was to prepare Germany for
the eventual conflict with the United States. 11
Hitler's statements about the United States changed in
the early 1930s.

The German dictator felt America had been

permanently weakened by the Great Depression, especially due
to the influence of African-Americans and Jews. 12

But

Hitler still felt that Germany would have to defeat the
united States, 13 especially since he hoped to dominate
Mexico and Latin America some day. 14
Roosevelt resolved to convince the American public of the
fascist threat and to gain support for his policies. This
would justify further support of a war and eventual United
States entry into the conflict-all to support the Allies'
goals and to keep the world free for democracy, selfdetermination, and human rights.
11

Gerhard L. Weinberg, Foreign Policy of Hitler's
Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36 (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 21.
12
Weinberg, Foreign Policy 1933-36, 21.
13
Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's
Germany: Starting world war II, 1937-1939 (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1980), 252.
14
Weinberg, Foreign Policy 1933-36, 22.

7

In order to secure popular support for his programs, and
to prepare the country for even greater commitments to the
Allies, Roosevelt had to blunt the arguments of the
isolationists.

He did this in a "Fireside Chat" radio

broadcast on December 29, 1940.

In this broadcast, the

President warned listeners that should the Axis powers win
world war II and gain control of Europe, Asia, Africa, and
the Pacific, "all of us, in all the Americas, would be
living at the point of a gun-a gun loaded with explosive
bullets economic as well as military. " 15
Roosevelt argued that the solution to this threat was not
to encourage a negotiated peace, as advocated by the
isolationists, but rather to send aid to opponents of
aggression.

Sending armaments to England would not commit

the United States to entering the war, the President said.
Instead, it would allow the Allies to continue to fight for
their own liberty and American security. 16 Roosevelt said:
We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us
this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We
must apply ourselves to our task with the same
resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same
spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would
show were we at war. 17

15

Dallek, 256.
16
Ibid., 256-257.
17
Ibid., 257.

8

After this statement, messages to the White House ran
100-to-1 in favor of the speech.

A public opinion poll

conducted soon after the broadcast showed that 80 percent of
those who had heard or read the speech approved of it; only
12 percent opposed it.

Moreover, Roosevelt's Fireside Chat

had been heard or read by more of the American public than
any previous speech by the President. 18

A Gallup Poll

conducted the next day showed that 60 percent of U.S. voters
favored aiding Great Britain. 19
Encouraged by the results of his Fireside Chat, Roosevelt
planned to formally propose aid to the Allies.

To further

emphasize the Allied need for American armaments, and to
strengthen public support, the President framed the war in
moral terms.

He did this in his "Four Freedoms" speech,

which he delivered on January 6, 1941.
The Allied leadership put forward two basic statements
that outlined the foundation of the Allied cause: the "Four
Freedoms" speech and the Atlantic Charter.

To the American

public, these statements defined the moral purpose of the
war. They gave the public a clear reason to change their
views from isolationist withdrawal to outward support of the
Allied cause.

In the Four Freedoms speech, the President

18

Ibid., 257-258.

19

Gallup Poll Reports, 118.

9

argued that the fascist nations posed a direct threat to
democracy in general and the United States in particular:
Every realist knows that the democratic way of
life is at this moment being directly assailed in
every part of the world-assailed either by arms,
or by secret spreading of poisonous propaganda by
those who seek to destroy unity and promote
discord in nations still at peace ....
I find it necessary to report that the future and
safety of our country and of our democracy are
overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our
borders ....
The first phase of the invasion of this Hemisphere
would not be the landing of regular troops. The
necessary strategic points would be occupied by
secret agents and their dupes-great numbers of
them are already here, and in Latin America ....
As long as the aggressor nations maintain the
offensive, they-not we-will choose the time and
the place and the method of their attack. 20
After saying that the Axis nations posed a direct threat
to the United States, Roosevelt argued that the United
States had to lend all possible support to the Allied
countries.

The Allied countries had long traditions of

democratic institutions and respect for individual rights
which needed to be upheld.
The Axis countries, however, had replaced their
democratic institutions with fascist governments.

Fascist

governments sought to institute a totalitarian system that

2

°Franklin Roosevelt, "State of the Union Address, "
<http://www.libertynet.org/~edcivic/fdr.html>, 6 January
1942.

10

glorified the nation and its people, not the individual.
This took the form of extreme nationalism, where other
nationalities or ethnic groups were considered inferior.
This manifested itself in acts of war and aggression to
accomplish the subjugation of "inferior" peoples.
Roosevelt used the Four Freedoms speech to argue that the
United States could fight these anti-democratic ideas by
supplying arms to Britain and the other countries opposing
Germany.

In this way, the United States would act "as an

arsenal for them as for ourselves." 21

Using its arms,

money, and influence, the united States' goal was to create
a world based on what Roosevelt defined as the four basic
human freedoms: speech, religion, prosperity, and security.
The first is freedom of speech and expressioneverywhere in the world. The second is freedom of
every person to worship God in his own wayeverywhere in the world. The third is freedom
from want-which, translated into world terms,
means economic understandings which will secure to
every nation a healthy peace time life for its
inhabitants-everywhere in the world. The fourth
is freedom from fear-which translated into world
terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments
to such a point and in such a fashion that no
nation will be in a position to commit an act of
physical aggression against any neighbor-anywhere
in the world .... That kind of world is the very
antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny
which the dictators seek to create with the crash
of a bomb. 22

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid.

11
The President's statement alarmed isolationists, who
interpreted the speech as Roosevelt's attempt to commit the
United States as the "guardian of the world's virtue. " 23
But the overall mood of the nation seemed to be changing.

A

January 24, 1941 Gallup Poll indicated that two out of three
American voters now favored aid to Britain. 24
For his part, Roosevelt sought to reinforce the nation's
commitment to the moral policy of restoring or advancing the
Four Freedoms throughout the world.

Moreover, he aimed to

identify his Four Freedoms policy with assistance to Great
Britain. 25

In doing so, he hoped to eliminate the political

stalemate between the isolationists and the interventionists
in Congress and in the country. 26

Even though the United

States was not yet in the war, Roosevelt sought to educate
the public about the ideals and beliefs the war was about.
When the United States eventually entered the war, as the
President felt it would, the public would be willing to work
long hours, support rationing, and send their sons to fight
in foreign countries, all sacrifices necessary to achieve
victory.
23

Thomas N. Guinsburg, The Pursuit of Isolationism in
the United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbor
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1982), 255.
24
Gallup Poll Reports, 119.
25
Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther, ed.,
The Atlantic Charter (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994),
11-12.
26
Ibid. , 14.
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Roosevelt seized the opportunity to further promote his
goal when he, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
their advisors agreed to secretly meet off the coast of
Newfoundland in August 1941.

The moment Roosevelt awaited

came at the end of the conference, when the British and
American leaders signed the Atlantic Charter.
Taking its cue from Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, the
Atlantic Charter reinforced and expanded the President's
moral statements and established a set of common policy
goals.

Here, in essence, was a description of principles

that the Allies, including the United States, felt that war
was being fought for.
The Atlantic Charter established eight key principles,
each based on democratic ideals and respect for national and
individual rights and freedoms:
First, their countries [the United States and the
United Kingdom] seek no aggrandizement,
territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes
that do not accord with the freely expressed
wishes of the people concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to
choose the form of government under which they
will live; and they wish to see sovereign right
and self government restored to those who have
been forcibly deprived of them;
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for
their existing obligations, to further the
enjoyment of all States, great of small, victor or
vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the
trade and to the raw materials of the world which
are needed for their economic prosperity;

13

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest
collaboration between all nations in the economic
field with the object of securing, for all,
improved labor standards, economic advancement and
social security;
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi
tyranny, they hope to see established a peace
which will afford to all nations the means of
dwelling in safety within their borders, and which
will afford assurance that all the men in all
lands may live out their lives in freedom from
fear and want;
Seventh, such a peace should enable men to
traverse the high seas and oceans without
hindrance;
Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the
world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons
must come to the abandonment of the use of
force. 27
The Atlantic Charter asserted the intention of the United
States to restore democratic values to the European
countries wrecked by war.

The obstacle to the advancement

of these goals was Nazi Germany.
Roosevelt did not expect to convince the public to
embrace entry into World War II immediately.

Public opinion

polls showed that the American public still opposed taking
an active role in the war; 74 percent still opposed
involvement-only a one percent drop from a pre-conference
poll.

Indeed, the Atlantic Conference failed to drain

support away from the isolationists, who berated the
27

"Joint Declaration of the President of the United
States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain." The
Department of State Bulletin V (16 August 1941): 125-126.
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Atlantic Charter for ignoring the freedoms of religion and
speech. 28
At the same time, however, an August 24 Gallup Poll
showed that 73 percent of the public strongly supported the
President's foreign policy. 29

This signified that the

public recognized the principles at stake in World war II
and approved of Roosevelt's efforts to help the Allies.
Roosevelt had succeeded in adding a moral element to the
discussion of American involvement in the war, a point
which Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter raised in a
letter to the President just days after the conference:
We live by symbols and we can't too often recall
them ... And you two in that ocean ... Gave meaning
to the conflict between civilization and arrogant,
brute challenge; and gave promise more powerful
and binding than any formal treaty could, that
civilization has brains and resources that tyranny
will not be able to overcome ... The deed and the
spirit and the invigoration breathed there in the
hearts of men will endure and will kindle actions
toward the goal of ridding the world of this
horror. 30
The American public came to regard the Four Freedoms and the
Atlantic Charter as the moral basis of American policy
before and after the United States' entrance into the war.

28

Dallek, 284-285.

29

Gallup Poll Reports, 126.

30

Dallek, 284.
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The first real test of these principles did not come
until after the United States had been in the war for almost
a year; however, it proved a decisive moment for the United
States-Allied policy.

In hopes of gaining a base of

operations for an eventual move into southern Europe,
British and American forces, in an operation code-named
TORCH, landed in French North Africa on November 8, 1942.
France was then ruled by a quasi-fascist government at
Vichy. This government had signed an armistice with Nazi
Germany in July 1940.
At the time of the American landings, the French Minister
of Marine, Admiral Jean Fran~ois Darlan, was located in
Algiers, the administrative capital of French North Africa.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the commander of the North African
invasion force, agreed to recognize Darlan's authority as
head of the French North African administration in return
for a cease-fire agreement.
Negotiating with Darlan was a calculated risk for
Eisenhower.

As a member of the Vichy government, Darlan had

instituted authoritarian policies and collaborated with the
Nazis.

In addition, recognizing and preserving Darlan's

authority was sure to anger Charles de Gaulle's exiled Free
French organization, which had continued to resist the
Germans even after the French defeat.

More importantly,

negotiating with Darlan raised the specter of appeasement,

16

suggesting that the Allies were not as committed to
eliminating fascism as they claimed.
Eisenhower recognized Darlan's significance.

Only

Darlan, as the appointed successor to the Vichy Premier,
Marshal Petain, had the authority to give orders to the
French soldiers and sailors in North Africa.

Only Darlan

could order the French troops to cease their resistance to
Allied forces.

Eisenhower's negotiations saved American and

British lives and allowed the Allies to advance more rapidly
against German positions in Tunisia.
Despite these advantages, the "Darlan Deal" caused a
public uproar in the united States and Great Britain.

To

the public, it seemed as if the Allies were abandoning their
proclaimed principles of restoring democratic institutions
and eliminating fascism, as embodied in the Four Freedoms
and the Atlantic Charter.
Negotiating seemed to suggest to the Allied public that
the threat posed by fascism was not as great as originally
portrayed.

The public demanded an explanation for the

Darlan Deal; if fascism did not pose a threat to democracy,
then why were the American and British peoples sacrificing
so much for the war effort?

The public outcry against the

Darlan Deal became so great that President Roosevelt was
moved to make the unconditional surrender pledge during the
Casablanca Conference to restore the moral basis for the
war.

17
CHAPTER II
ENTER DARLAN

Darlan's rise to political power began during the German
invasion of France.

On May 10, 1940, the German army

crossed the border into Belgium and the Netherlands.

To the

world, it appeared as if Germany intended to invade France
as it had during World War I, through the Low Countries.
The British and French armies stationed in France quickly
responded to the German threat by crossing into Belgium and
taking up defensive positions. 31
However, on May 14, German tanks broke through the
Ardennes Forest, long thought impassable, along the FrenchGerman border.

Motorized infantry and armored corps

followed the tank units into France to reinforce German
positions.

Once secure inside France, the German tanks

turned toward the English Channel, trapping the French and
British armies in Belgium between two German armies. 32
With the French army surrounded and the Germans advancing
toward Paris, the French Premier, Paul Reynaud, appointed
Marshal Henri Petain to the position of vice-premier on May
18.

Reynaud later claimed that he brought Petain into the

31

William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Touchstone,
1981}, 713.
32

Ibid., 723-724.
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French cabinet because the marshal was one of France's most
popular military figures.

Reynaud said he felt Petain's

prestige would strengthen the public's morale. 33
Whatever benefit Petain's presence in the cabinet may
have brought, it did not slow the advance of the German
armies.

On June 14, the German army entered Paris and the

French Government relocated to Bordeaux.

It seemed as if

France would be completely overrun by the Germans. 34
The following day, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill received a telegram from Reynaud, asking the Prime
Minister to release France from its pledge not to seek a
separate peace with the Germans.

On June 16, the French

cabinet received official permission from its British ally
to ask for armistice terms, but the British cabinet included
one important condition:
On condition, but only on condition that the
French fleet shall be directed to British ports
pending negotiations, the Government of His
Majesty gives its full consent to an inquiry by
the French Government with a view to finding out
the conditions for an armistice. His Majesty's
Government being determined to continue the war,
will abstain completely from any part in this
inquiry concerning an armistice. 3

33

William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1947), 7-9.
34
Weinberg, 13 8.
35
Langer, 3 6-3 7.

19
To prevent a French surrender, later that same day
Churchill proposed a union of France and the United Kingdom,
the first such union since Henry V had defeated the French
army and concluded the Treaty of Troyes in 1420. 36

The plan

would have set up a single war cabinet that would control
the armed forces of both nations for the remainder of the
war. 37
General Charles De Gaulle, Reynaud's representative in
London, especially favored the idea and urged the British
cabinet to approve the union. 38

Reynaud introduced the

proposal to the French cabinet, but it was never seriously
considered.

Petain rejected the proposal saying it was just

a British device to prevent an armistice. 39

Other French

cabinet officers discarded the union proposal as a British
plot to acquire French colonial possessions. 40
A discouraged Reynaud resigned the night of June 16; he
was replaced by Marshal Petain.

Although the French

President asked Reynaud to form a new cabinet composed of
members favoring resistance, Reynaud refused. 41

36

The next

John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory (New York:
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1993), 415.
37
38

Langer, 3 8 .

Weinberg, A world At Arms, 139-140.
39
Langer, 3 8 .
4
°Charmley, 415.
41
Langer, 3 9 .
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day, Petain, through the Spanish ambassador to France, asked
the Germans for armistice terms. 42
Petain replaced those ministers who favored continued
resistance against the Germans with supporters of an
armistice.

As his Minister of Marine, Petain selected a

high-ranking naval officer and a long-time associate,
Admiral Jean Darlan. 43
Admiral Darlan was no stranger to politics; from 19261939, he served as chief of staff for the French minister of
the navy.

The position gave him close access to important

members of the French Third Republic, a connection he used
to gain funds for increased naval construction.

Under

Darlan's supervision, the French navy had reached its
largest size ever.

Despite its apparent strengths, though,

the navy never distinguished itself in the war against the
Axis. 44
Darlan, however, remained committed to the Allied cause.
After the Soviet Union, then Allied with Nazi Germany,
invaded Finland in 1940, for example, the admiral wanted to
send forces to aid the Finns.

Darlan argued that the Allies

could send troops to Finland by going through Norway and
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Sweden.

This would also allow the Allies to control the

flow of Norwegian iron ore through Sweden to Germany.

When

the Germans invaded Norway itself in 1940, Darlan remained
active in planning Allied resistance to the German
landings . 45
The French navy could do to little to prevent the
collapse of the French army after the Germans invaded,
although Darlan did command the French navy at Dunkirk and
helped evacuate the British and French troops trapped there.
For his efforts, he was recognized by the British
government. 46

However, ten days after receiving this award,

Darlan arrived in Bourdeaux to assume his position as
Minister of Marine, in a government seeking an armistice
with the Germans.

Since the French army had been defeated,

the only bargaining piece the French had left was their
fleet.

As head of France's only remaining military force,

Darlan was bound to become a major player in Petain's
government. 47
Aside from the importance the French fleet would grant
him, Darlan seemed to have another reason to favor an
armistice with Germany. The admiral, like many in Petain's
cabinet, felt the war was all but over; Darlan predicted a

45

Ibid.

46

De Montmorency, 87.

47

Paxton, 111.

22

British surrender in eight weeks. 48

Why prolong a losing

conflict and risk receiving harsher terms?
It may have been for this reason that Darlan opposed the
British demand to send the French fleet to the United
Kingdom.

While the British had a vested interest in seeing

that the French fleet did not fall into German hands, Darlan
also had a vested interest in keeping the fleet in French
territory.

Sending the fleet to Britain would eliminate

Darlan's basis of power and would also deprive France of its
most important bargaining chip, possibly to see it used as a
bargaining chip by the British in a few months. 49
However, the Americans, like the British, were seriously
concerned about the fate of the French fleet.

Roosevelt was

so concerned that his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, sent
a message urging the French Government to refuse any German
demand to surrender the French fleet.

The American

ambassador to France delivered this message to both the
French foreign minister and Admiral Darlan on June 18. 50
The message read, in part:
The President desires you to say that in the
opinion of this Government, should the French
Government, before concluding any armistice with
the Germans, fail to see that the fleet is kept
out of the hands or her opponents, the French
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Government will be pursuing a policy which will
fatally impair the preservation of the French
Empire and the eventual restoration of French
independence and autonomy. Furthermore, should
the French Government fail to take these steps and
permit the French Fleet to be surrendered to
Germany, the French Government will permanently
lose the friendship and goodwill of the Government
of the united States. 51
The foreign minister brought the American message to the
French cabinet.

To reassure the Americans, the cabinet

voted to refuse any German demand to surrender the fleet and
informed the American and British ambassadors of the French
Government's action. 52
The next day, June 19, 1940, a British delegation arrived
to seek further French assurances on the status of the
fleet.

The delegation consisted of Lord Lloyd, Admiral Sir

Dudley Pound, and Albert Alexander, the First Lord of the
Adrniralty. 53

Since it seemed evident that France would

accept German armistice terms, Alexander proposed that the
French fleet be transferred to America for the duration of
the war.

This Darlan would not accept.

Sending the fleet

to America would weaken France's bargaining position with
the Germans-and eliminate the basis of Darlan's own power.
"Marshal Petain has given the British Government his
soldier's word that he will not surrender a single unit of
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the French Fleet to the foes of Great Britain," Darlan said.
"You also have my word.

Is that not a sufficient guarantee

for you?" Alexander replied, "We have no use for words."

At

Alexander's words, Petain rose from the table and the last
British and French allied meeting came to an end. 54
France signed the armistice with Germany at Compiegne,
the site of the World War I armistice, on June 21, 1940.
The terms were harsh, but allowed France to retain some
sovereignty.

While the Channel and Atlantic coasts were

occupied, the French government was allowed to retain
control of southern areas, essentially creating a rump
state.

The French government also retained control of its

colonial holdings, but had to pay massive reparations. 55
Most important to Great Britain, the armistice recalled the
French navy to metropolitan French ports where they would be
demilitarized for the duration of the war. 56
The fall of France radically changed American public
opinion.

In May 1940, before the French surrender, a poll

of American public opinion found that 33 percent of
Americans favored American funding of the British war
effort, even if it meant war between the United States and
Germany. A slightly greater group, 38 percent, opposed a
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United States entrance into the war, but still favored aid
to Britain and France.

Only 23 percent opposed all aid to

the Allied countries.~
After the French defeat, American public opinion had
changed greatly.

Britain fought Germany alone.

Fifty-three

percent of Americans now stated that they gave a higher
priority to defeating Hitler than keeping the U.S. out of
the war.

This figure rose to 68 percent by December.

Only

12 percent of those polled still favored strict
neutrality. 58

For the first time, a clear consensus was

developing that fascism posed a threat to America itself.
The American government shared the anxiety of its
populace toward Hitler.

In order to curtail German

influence in France, the U.S. government centered its
foreign policy on three goals: to prevent the French navy
from being used by the Germans; to prevent Axis control of
French territories in Africa and North America; and to
prevent French collaboration with the Germans. 59

This

policy was clearly spelled out by President Roosevelt in a
letter to Marshal Petain on October 25, 1940:
The Government of the United States received from
the Petain Government during the first days it
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held office the most solemn assurances that the
French Fleet would not be surrendered. If the
French Government now permits the Germans to use
the French Fleet in hostile operations against the
British Fleet, such action would constitute a
flagrant and deliberate breach of faith with the
United States Government.
Any agreement entered into between France and
Germany which partook of the character above
mentioned would most definitely wreck the
traditional friendship between the French and
American peoples, would permanently remove any
chance that this Government would be disposed to
give any assistance to the French people in their
distress, and would create a wave of bitter
indignation against France on the part of the
American public opinion 60
On December 14, 1940, the American charge d'affaires met
with Admiral Darlan.

This was a particularly important

meeting as the admiral was about to become vice-president of
the council; in effect, Petain's prime minister.

Darlan

reassured the American diplomat that the French navy and
French territories would never be surrendered to the Axis.
However, Darlan said the Germans would probably win the war,
which would be better for France.

If the British won the

war, Darlan said, they would take valuable colonies like
Madagascar and Dakar from France, but Germany would take
less important territories like Alsace and Lorraine ("which
are lost anyway") , the Cameroons and British Nigeria. 61
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Darlan went on to denounce the British.

He claimed the

British high command was composed of imbeciles, and
condemned the unreliability of "the drunkard Churchill."
Although the French fleet would never be surrendered to the
Germans, the French might attack Gibraltar if the British
attempted to blockade France.

"With Spanish and German help

the Rock wouldn't hold out long," Darlan claimed. 62
Darlan's argument had some basis in fact; the Spanish
government had been aided by the Germans and Italians during
the Spanish civil war in the 1930s.

If Spain decided to

enter the war on the Axis side, Gibraltar would certainly be
attacked.
American foreign relations with Vichy France served
another purpose.

By keeping relations with France open,

Roosevelt hoped to gain information that the United States
could use later, during an American invasion of French North
African territory.

Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt's speech

writer, claimed that the president had begun planning in
August 1940 for an African invasion, months after France had
surrendered to Germany and over a year before the U.S.
entered the war.
Sherwood reported that Roosevelt had also prepared a map
of the eastern coastal defenses of the United States.
president showed the map to Harry Hopkins, one of the
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Roosevelt's top aides, and argued that only 1.5 percent of
the American coastline could be defended against invasion.
An enemy could choose from any number of points to make a

landing. 63
Bearing this fact in mind, Roosevelt argued that American
forces should pre-empt an attack by first landing on enemyheld territory.

"On the northwest coast of Africa, for

instance," the president told Hopkins. 64

Roosevelt was no

doubt influenced by a report sent to Washington by the
American naval attache to France.

After a tour of North

Africa, the attache reported that France could only re-enter
the war from its African colonies.

The attache based his

opinion on the presence of 125,000 French soldiers on active
duty and another 200,000 in reserve in North Africa.
Roosevelt transferred a State department official, Robert
Murphy, from France to North Africa in order to contact and
support anti-Nazi French military leaders. 65
But Roosevelt's maneuvering was hidden from the public.
The longer he continued relations with Vichy, the more the
American public began to attack the policy.

The American

press fully reported the authoritarian and collaborationist
character of the Vichy regime, but did not immediately
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question continued relations.

Criticism developed slowly,

largely due to statements by American officials who spoke of
Vichy's dangerous relationship with German.

Secretary of

the Navy Frank Knox delivered such a speech in New York on
April 24, 1941:
Too few of us realize, and still fewer
acknowledge, the size of the disaster to American
hemispheric safety if Germany, already the
conqueror of France, should establish herself in
Dakar, a French colonial possession. From there,
with her surface ships, submarines and long-range
bombers, a victorious Germany could substantially
cut us off from all commerce with South America
and make the Monroe Doctrine a scrap of paper. 66
An anti-Vichy editorial appeared in the July 14, 1941

edition of the New York Times.

The editorial, titled

"Bastille Day," recognized that July 14 was the French
equivalent of the American July 4.

Before the French

Revolution, the French monarchy used the Bastille to
imprison republican sympathizers, the paper said.

The

storming of the Bastille signified the French rejection of
monarchy and the rise of democracy.

However, the Times

claimed that no French citizen would celebrate July 14,
1941.

The Nazis had established a new Bastille.
This is a bastion that must be stormed and
destroyed; a new emblem of tyranny that must
disappear from France. The task is gigantic, but
the French, remembering their past, will be equal
to the future. While the Nazis occupy France,
66
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each day is Bastille Day for its people: a
reminder of their tradition of liberty and a
renewed call to action. 67
An editorial titled "Encirclement" appeared in the

Christian Science Monitor on August 11, 1941.

The paper

warned readers that Germany was positioned to topple the
world's democracies.
On the checkerboard of world war the Nazis are
attacking at every available point. They know
that their engagement with Russia is offering the
democratic powers a golden opportunity to take the
offensive. In this crisis they are trying to use
Japan, Italy, and Vichy France to distract,
confuse and hamper any strong British-American
move ... Vichy is moving toward an active alliance
which would give Berlin a military and naval
advantage more than counterbalancing American
occupation of Iceland. 68
Only by giving the full measure of American support,
"something stronger than words or ineffective economic
pressures," to Britain to counter fascist threats could
American democracy be secure, the paper claimed. 69
More anti-Vichy articles appeare~ in the August 27, 1941
issue of the New York Post.

The paper's main editorial, for

instance, took the State Department to task for its
"appeasement trade with Vichy-the reciprocal exchange of
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goods with French North Africa which should have stopped
short the moment Petain embraced the Axis ...

For all the

public knows, that suicide barter goes on." 70
In his "I'd Rather Be Right" column, nationally
syndicated columnist Samuel Grafton discussed the measures
that democracy needed to take in order to defend itself
against fascism.

He warned readers that fascist states had

strongholds in the Western Hemisphere.
A consciously democratic approach would have begun
with the diagnosis that France had become Fascist.
It would then have recalled that Germany had been
Fascist for some years. It would have reached the
same conclusion that, since both countries now
belonged to the same system, democracy had nothing
to hope from either. We ought then to have seized
the French colonies at once, realizing that they
had been transferred to Fascism the moment France
went Fascist; that Herr Hitler did not need a deed
to Martinique so long as he had a deed to
Petain. 71
The same edition saw a letter to the editor from the
Clearing House for Youth Groups expressing the
organization's preference for de Gaulle's Free French.

The

youth organization urged President Roosevelt to "help the
world's fight against tyranny" by recognizing the Free
French, providing Lend Lease aid to the Free French, and by
"occupying Martinique and all French possessions in this

70

Samuel Grafton, "I'd Rather Be Right," The New York
Post, 27 August 1941, 18.
71

Ibid.

32

hemisphere, to be held in trust for the people of France
until their freedom has been rewon." 72
Given the disapproval of Vichy France and its
collaborationist policies, as expressed in the media, it
would seem only natural that this disapproval would extend
to the individual members of the Vichy Government.

The Four

Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter dedicated the Allies to
restoring democratic government and human rights to those
living in fascist occupied territories.

By definition,

those who served fascist states and attempted to establish a
political and social order that ran counter to the
principles of the Atlantic Charter should be counted among
the enemy.

The American public clearly took this line of

thinking in regard to Vichy officials.
On February 13, 1941, Current History ran an article
profiling the major personages in the Vichy government.

The

journal described Darlan as:
A Navy man, an admiral, and therefore by training
and tradition anti-British-the officers of the
French Navy for generations have resented the
superiority of British sea power. Jean Darlan is
also ambitious. For both these reasons he is more
likely to approve of "collaboration" with the
Germans, though he is unquestionably a sincere
patriot. 73
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On May 26, 1941, Life magazine discussed Darlan's role in
aligning Vichy France with Nazi Germany.

Given the French

government's actions, the magazine claimed, American foreign
policy should favor the exiled, anti-Nazi Free French
organization, headed by Gen. Charles de Gaulle:
The French Vichy Government and Nazi Germany
quietly reached an understanding which was very
bad news indeed for the democracies. Following a
50-minute conference with Hitler at Berchtesgaden,
Admiral Fran~ois Darlan, French Vice Premier,
agreed that France would here-after stand together
with Germany on economic and apparently political
matters .... This meant that France was betting on
a Nazi victory. The only remaining Frenchmen whom
the U.S. could now treat as friends were the Free
French, fighting hard for the Allies under General
Charles de Gaulle. 74

Time magazine also associated Darlan with fascist
policies in it May 26, 1941 issue by stating that when
Darlan replaced Pierre Laval, the French archcollaborationist, as vice premier it was widely viewed as an
anti-Nazi move.

"But in Vice Premier Admiral Darlan the old

Marshal picked a successor to Laval who has made himself
superbly persona grata at Berchtesgaden and who is, in
addition, much less unpopular in France than the scheming M.
Laval. " 75
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By joining the Vichy government, Admiral Darlan became,
in the view of the American public, a fascist by
association, and therefore an enemy.

Roosevelt had turned

American public opinion in support of aiding the Allies
through moral arguments.

The Vichy government had been

profiled as a collaborationist, hostile, fascist state by
both the media and the United States government.

After

these developments it was impossible to reconcile
negotiations with fascists with the stated purpose of the
war.

The groundwork had been laid for the public criticism

that resulted from Eisenhower's negotiations with Admiral
Darlan for a cease-fire during the North African campaign.
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CHAPTER III
THE ROAD TO ALGERIA

General Eisenhower arrived at Gibraltar on November 4,
1942.

He would later call it "the most dismal setting we

occupied during the war."

His quarters and office were

little more than damp caves filled with stagnant air and lit
by light bulbs that only partially illuminated the
underground tunnels.

Since the invasion force was still

three days away from the landing sites, there was little for
Eisenhower to do but wait. 76
He had originally planned to move his base of operations
from England to Gibraltar on Monday, November 2 but weather
had prevented his leaving until Wednesday morning.

To cover

his absence in Britain, it was announced to the press that
Eisenhower would be returning to Washington D.C. for
conferences.

Not even Eisenhower's wife, Marnie, knew that

her husband was really preparing to lead an invasion force
into North Africa; she was waiting for him in washington. 77
To keep himself busy in the days before the Allied
landings in North Africa, Eisenhower dictated letters and
designed plans for the next phase of operations.
76
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prepared a message to be delivered by the French General
Henri Giraud.

The message stated that Giraud had entered

into an alliance with the Allies and urged the French army
not to resist the landings.

The message would be sent by

radio to Giraud on the British submarine Seraph; where he
was to approve the message so that it could be dropped by
airplane into North Africa.

A British admiral proposed

issuing all statements in Giraud's name since he was,
effectively, in Allied hands.

Eisenhower rejected the

proposal. 78
Giraud had become important only one month before when
Eisenhower's deputy commander, General Mark
secretly landed in North Africa.

w.

Clark, had

Robert Murphy, Roosevelt's

consul in North Africa, had succeeded in arranging a meeting
between pro-Allied French officers, led by General Charles
E. Mast, and Allied representatives.

Clark sought to assure

the cooperation of underground French forces during the
American invasion of French North Africa in November. 79
Mast promised to organize the French underground in support
of the Allied invasion, but Mast and Clark disagreed on who
should lead the invasion force.
Mast had told Murphy earlier that month that he favored
French General Henri H. Giraud as commander of the Allied
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invasion force.

Mast had opposed the idea of Giraud serving

under Eisenhower and had proposed that Eisenhower retain
command of the American forces while making Giraud Supreme
Commander.

Mast argued that with Giraud in command the

Allies could take Algiers "practically without firing a
shot. " 80
Giraud was favored so heavily by Mast because of his
obvious anti-German credentials.

Giraud had been taken as a

prisoner of war by the Germans in both world wars
successfully escaping both times.

After his escape in the

first world war, Giraud had dressed as a woman and a circus
performer to hide from the Germans in Belgium. 81

Most

recently he had escaped from Konigstein castle in April by
weaving together several sections of wire-filled rope
smuggled to him in cans of ham. 82

He again evaded the

German secret police before finally escaping to Switzerland
and then to France.

After he arrived at Vichy on April 27,

he prepared a report for Marshal Petain on the causes of the
French defeat.

Although Giraud blamed the defeat on moral

grounds and favored an authoritarian regime, he continued to
oppose Nazi Germany and he told Petain that Germany could
not win the war. 83

Because of this background, Mast favored
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Giraud over all other possible French leaders, but it was
already too late.
By the time Mast put Giraud's name forward as supreme
commander, Roosevelt had already chosen Eisenhower to lead
the invasion force, making Giraud little more than an Allied
puppet.

Clark kept this to himself and dodged Mast's

proposal, saying only that the Allies wanted to turn North
Africa over to the French as quickly as possible.

Clark did

state, however, that a simultaneous Allied landing in
southern France, which Giraud demanded, would not happen.
An invasion of France would only come after the Allies

secured North Africa. 84

Mast accepted this reply and

committed the North African French resistance to the
American cause.

As a result, when Giraud boarded the Seraph

en route to Gibraltar, he thought he was about to take
command of the invasion force.
When Giraud arrived at Gibraltar on November 7, he
immediately demanded to speak with Eisenhower.

The French

general walked into Eisenhower's cave and slapped a memo on
his desk.

In the memo, Giraud requested a radio

transmitter, an airplane, some American staff officers, and
facilities for a forward command post.

Ignoring these

demands, Eisenhower said he wanted Giraud to make a
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statement that would be broadcast to Morocco and Algeria. 85
An argument ensued. Eisenhower would later report:

Giraud initially refused to issue any statement
for broadcast tonight, either from Gibraltar or
from London or Washington. He insisted
specifically that no radios should emanate from
either national capital or from Allied
Headquarters which would connect his name in any
way with the operation in North Africa. Giraud
flatly refused to participate in the operation in
any other capacity than that of Supreme Commander.
He insisted upon a position which would make him
completely independent to carry out his own
strategic and tactical conceptions ....
Giraud is obsessed with the idea of an immediate
move into France and implies that if he were made
commander he would promptly use the entire air
force coming into North Africa for the
neutralization of Sardinia and to protect the
transportation of troop into southern France; that
he would transfer the fighter and bomber units
thereafter to airfields in southern France. 86
Eisenhower refused Giraud's proposals.

This began six

hours of discussions between Eisenhower and Giraud, during
which Eisenhower repeatedly offered Giraud command of French
forces in North Africa after the Allied forces had moved
into Tunisia.

Eisenhower even offered Giraud money to build

an army and an air force.

Giraud continued to refuse,

demanding total command of the invasion force and at one
point went so far as to say that, once he was made Supreme
Commander, he would not be responsible to the Combined
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Chiefs of Staff in Washington D.C.

As far as Giraud was

concerned, Eisenhower could deal with the
matters while Giraud directed the war.

ccs on supply

Eisenhower may have

been willing to concede some points, but he certainly would
not give up the position of supreme commander. 87

Nor did

Giraud's goals, arguments, plans, or demeanor suggest that
he would have made a successful Allied commander.
Even if he had wanted to, Eisenhower was in no position
to surrender command of the Allied forces to any Frenchman.
A great deal of planning and effort had gone into organizing
the American-British invasion force.

The whole campaign had

been designed to coincide with a British advance from El
Alamein, Egypt, upon German lines in Libya.

Submitting to a

commander who would drastica~ly alter the battle plan would
upset a whole range of contingency plans. 88
Giraud's position was just as easily understandable.

He

had long worked on plans for leading an uprising in southern
France and it was hard for him to abandon them.
Furthermore, a foreign power was about to invade French
territory in his name, yet he was granted no actual power.
He was being asked to fight against the legitimate French
government by younger commanders with less experience.
Faced with these prospects, Giraud felt he deserved the
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position of Supreme Commander or, as he told Eisenhower at
the end of their discussions, "Giraud will be a spectator in
this affair." 89
By the time the meeting between Eisenhower and Giraud
ended, the first Allied forces were already going ashore.
Reports reached Gibraltar that the surf along the Moroccan
coast was low, allowing the American forces to go ashore.
Soon afterwards came news that the landings at Oran had been
unopposed, but there was still no reports from the forces
which were landing in Algiers.

Exhausted from the day's

events, Eisenhower unfolded a cot in his office at 4:30 a.m.
and went to sleep.

He would be up again at 7:00 a.m. 90

The final round of discussions with Giraud began at 10:00
a.m. when the French general returned to Eisenhower's
command center.

The Allied staff gave Giraud an exaggerated

report of the invasion's success; in truth, the Allied
Headquarters still lacked accurate reports of the ground
action.

After hearing these reports he entered Eisenhower's

office.

Eisenhower opened the meeting by telling Giraud

that he could not serve two masters, both the CCS and
Giraud.

Giraud claimed he understood Eisenhower's position

and did not want command of the air and sea forces, but
again asked for command of the land forces.
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again refused but offered to consult Giraud on all major
decisions.

Giraud finally accepted Eisenhower's

proposals. 91
In essence, Giraud accepted the very proposals advanced
by Eisenhower the previous day, as Eisenhower's report to
the ccs shows:
Giraud is recognized as the leader of the effort
to prevent Axis aggression in North Africa, as the
Commander-in-Chief of all French forces in the
region and as governor of the French North African
provinces. Eisenhower, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Allied American-British forces, will cooperate with Giraud to the fullest possible
extent, and will work in closest collaboration
with him.
Giraud will leave Gibraltar tomorrow for North
Africa, where he will do all in his power to stop
all French resistance to the Allied forces and to
begin the organization of French forces for use
against the Axis. 92

The North African Landings
In North Africa, the Allied forces met some resistance
from French forces, although the degree of resistance varied
greatly.

The American and British forces landing at Oran

and Algiers faced only light gunfire, but the American
forces landing in Morocco met with aggressive French action.
In large part this was due to the failure of the French
conspirators to launch a successful pro-Allied uprising.
91
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For example, in Morocco, one of the French generals
aligned with Mast, General Jean Bethouart, arrested General
Auguste Paul Nogues, the pro-Vichy Moroccan residentgeneral, in his home at midnight on November 8.

Bethouart

then left to aid the Americans forces coming ashore and
organize a rebellion against Vichy.

Bethouart, however, had

left Nogues alone in his home in Rabat.

Nogues phoned

Casablanca and ordered the head of the French naval forces
to resist the All.ied landings. 93
As a result, the Americans landing on the west coast
faced heavy French resistance.

Although the Americans

gained a beachhead, they were unable to take Casablanca.
The French battleship Jean Bart, docked in Casablanca
harbor, opened fire upon American ships at sea.

To protect

the landing forces, American fighter planes had to bomb the
Jean Bart, and other harbor defenses, and put the battleship
out of commission. 94
In Algiers, however, the French conspirators met with
more success.

On the night of November 7, armed groups of

conspirators, dressed in the uniforms of Volotaires de Place
{V.P}, spread out across the city.

At 9 p.m., General Mast

ordered every police station in the city to install these
V.P. units for "the protection of public order" due to the
93
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possibility of an enemy landing.

Every one of the stations

complied, letting the rebels easily seize control of the
police force.

By 1:45 a.m., the rebels even had control of

divisional headquarters. 95
The rebel action seemed a great success.

The Frenchmen

sent to seize the Centrale Protegee had taken the main
telephone switchboard.

Soon afterwards the post office,

Radio Alger, and the censors' listening station were taken.
Perhaps most importantly, the army's General Staff
Headquarters fell to the conspirators, who confined the
troops stationed there to their barracks.
Algiers was solidly in rebel hands.

By 2:35 a.m.

Armed conspirators had

seized control of important city buildings and had arrested
every major official capable of ordering resistance. 96
While the rebels were seizing control of the city, the
American consul in Algiers, Robert Murphy, went to the home
of General Alphonse Juin, the commander of French land and
air forces in North Africa.

Juin, surprised at Murphy's

arrival, greeted the American consul wearing his pajamas and
dressing gown. 97

Murphy informed Juin that an American

expeditionary force of 500,000 men was landing on the
Algerian coastline. 98
95
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The news caught Juin unprepared. "What! You mean the
convoy we have seen in the Mediterranean is going to land
here?" the general asked.

When Murphy replied that it was

Juin responded, "But you told me only a week ago that the
United States would not attack us."

Murphy told Juin that

the American forces were landing at French invitation and
intended to work with the French toward the liberation of
France. 99

"We hope for your cooperation, General, and the

cooperation of the French forces here against the common
enemy," Murphy told the French general.
occupy the greater part of France.
can France be free.

"German troops

Only through our victory

11100

"Were I the responsible commander here, I would accept
your offer," Juin said.

However, Admiral Darlan, Juin's

superior, had arrived in Algiers from France that very week.
Since Darlan could override any decision Juin made, the
French general felt it necessary to consult the Admiral.
Murphy agreed. 101
Darlan had arrived in Algiers on November 5 after
receiving news from Admiral Raymond Fenard that Darlan's
son, Alain, was close to death.

Alain had been struck with

polio while working as a traveling salesman in Tunisia.
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Although Alain's doctors told Darlan that his son's health
had improved, the admiral insisted on staying in North
Africa until November 10. 102
Darlan had already approached the Americans about joining
the Allied cause.

He knew of the coming invasion and may

have placed himself in North Africa for that very reason.
It is clear that many high-ranking Vichy officials knew of
the Allied plans in the weeks before the invasion. The same
day that Murphy told Mast when the invasion would occur, one
of the French North African conspirators cabled Darlan in
Vichy.

The cable said simply, "Date advanced. Landings

imminent."
Petain.

Darlan's staff forwarded this message to Marshal

One French general, Jean Marie Bergeret, urged the

marshal to go to North Africa and take command.

The general

argued that an Allied invasion would place the French North
African commanders in an ambiguous situation.

Petain

replied that one could not defend France by quitting it and
he did not want "to abandon forty million Frenchmen.

11103

On November 6, word reached Vichy that Allied convoys had
gathered at Gibraltar.

General Bergeret immediately flew to

North Africa and informed Darlan, at Alain's bedside, that
the Allies planned to invade French North Africa.

Darlan

ignored the warning and claimed the convoys were headed for

102
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Malta.

After leaving Darlan, Bergeret visited Darlan's

Algerian host, Admiral Fenard.

Bergeret soon discovered

that Fenard, who called Darlan to Algiers, also knew about
the American landings. 104
The evidence suggests that Darlan came to North Africa
knowing full well the date of the Allied landings and that
his son's health provided an excuse to leave France for
Algiers.
Whatever brought Darlan to Algiers, Murphy had to deal
with him.

General Juin phoned Darlan's villa and informed

Mme. Darlan that Murphy had an urgent message to deliver.

105

Murphy did not wait for the admiral long; Darlan arrived
within twenty minutes.

Murphy immediately told Darlan of

the American landings. 106

If Darlan had known of the Allied

operation before he had come to North Africa, he now seemed
genuinely surprised.

"I have known for a long time that the

British were stupid, but I always believed that the
Americans were more intelligent.

I begin to believe that

you make as many mistakes as they do, " Darlan said. 107
Murphy spent the next 15 minutes arguing with Darlan.
Murphy tried every argument he could think of to induce
Darlan to join the Americans, to persuade him to "seize this
104
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golden opportunity."

But Darlan refused to believe the

invasion was little more than a raid.

He claimed that if

the raid failed, the Germans would then invade North Africa,
which would make matters that much worse for France.

Darlan

asked Juin to send his chief of staff to contact the navy to
ascertain the size of the invasion. 100
When Juin's chief of staff tried to leave he found the
house surrounded by young men armed with rifles.

The leader

of the armed group claimed that only Murphy could leave the
house. 109

At this point, Juin and Darlan considered

themselves prisoners.

Murphy claimed that he had not

planned to draw Darlan into a trap and offered to send a
vice-consul, Harvey Pendar, "to find out who had placed the
watchdogs and have them called off." 110
While Pendar went to find someone with enough authority
to remove the guards, Murphy became involved in a political
discussion with Juin and Darlan.

They claimed that Murphy

had misled them about the date of the American landings,
that the Americans had come as allies, and that the
Americans had come in the name of Giraud, a man with no
legal authority.

"He is not your man," Darlan said.
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"Politically he is a child.

He's a good divisional

commander, nothing more." 111
Pendar returned to the house unable to find anyone who
could order the guards away, but he brought back Admiral
Fen.ard.

Earlier in the evening, a French conspirator

informed Fenard of the Algiers uprising and the admiral
joined in at once.

After meeting Pendar, Fenard agreed to

try and convince Darlan to order a surrender. 112
With Fenard present, Murphy tried a different approach.
He argued that in July 1941 Darlan had told Admiral William
Leahy, the U.S. ambassador to Vichy France, that the admiral
would make himself available if the U.S. ever sent 500,000
soldiers and several thousand tanks and planes to
Marseilles.

"That moment has now arrived," Murphy said,

"and it is your responsibility that no French blood will be
shed incident to the massive landing of American forces
which is now about to take place in French North Africa." 113
Darlan was not prepared to go so far.

He told Murphy

that he had spent two years advocating obedience to Marshal
Petain.

"I cannot now deny my oath," he explained.

Murphy

proposed that Darlan contact Petain and ask for
instructions.

Darlan immediately drafted a message to Vichy

111

Ibid., 86.

112

Ibid., 85-86.
Langer, 3 4 7 .

113

50
informing Petain of the American landings and asking the
marshal for freedom of action. 114
After Darlan had finished writing the message, Fenard
asked Pendar to deliver it to the Admiralty.

Instead of

delivering the message, Pendar drove to the pro-Allied rebel
headquarters and steamed the envelope open.

The message

read:
Admiral Darlan to Marshal Petain: I was summoned
at 0115 this morning by General Juin and found
with him Mr. Murphy who declared to me that on the
demand of a Frenchman, General Giraud, President
Roosevelt had decided to occupy French North
Africa with important forces this very morning, to
save France which they wished to maintain in its
integrity.
I answered that France had signed an armistice
convention and that I could but comply with the
orders of the Marshal to defend its territories. 115
After reading the message, the French rebels refused to
send the cable.

One of the rebel leaders told Pendar, "Tell

Bob [Murphy] we cannot possibly forward this cable.
not a matter of courtesy.

It is

It is giving the enemy a

weapon. " 116
Pendar returned to Juin's house and found Murphy pacing
in the gardens.

Pendar quickly told Murphy the contents of

Darlan's message, but Murphy wanted to know the location of
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the American forces.

While at rebel headquarters, Pendar

heard a rumor that the Americans had landed at Cap Matifou.
"What the devil are they doing out there, 30 miles from the
city?" Murphy roared.
About this same time, one of the French rebel leaders,
Jean Rigault, arrived to talk to Murphy.

Rigault worried

that the American troops might not arrive in time to support
the rebel uprising.

"I only guaranteed our operation for

this one night," he said.
here at 2 a.m.

"Your friends were supposed to be

Now they are three hours late.

it will be daylight.

At 7 o'clock

I cannot answer for what will happen

after that. " 117
The Americans had, in fact, landed fifteen miles east and
west of Algiers.

It took hours for the Allied troops to

reach the city from their landing positions. 118

The American

advance toward Algiers took longer than expected because
French and Arab speaking soldiers were not included in every
detachment. 119
As long as the French rebels held the city, the Americans
could enter Algiers from either the east or west without
meeting resistance.

Resistance could only occur if the

Allies tried to enter the harbor, where the Vichy Admiralty
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building in French North Africa was located. 120
Unfortunately, this was precisely what happened.
Less than an hour before Murphy and Rigault met, two
British destroyers-the H.M.S Broke and the H.M.S.
Malcolm-attempted to sail through the harbor and land troops
on the Quai de Dieppe. 121

As the two destroyers entered the

harbor, they appeared on the French Admiralty's radar.

The

city lights went out and search lights began to sweep the
harbor. 122
A spotlight fell on one of the destroyers and the naval
shore batteries opened fire.

Until this time, most Vichy

officers did not know that pro-Allied French rebels had
taken control of the city, but the sound of cannon fire
changed all that.

With the start of the bombardment, Vichy

officers began to report to their stations, but the rebels
quickly took them into custody.

This presented problems for

the conspirators; they only numbered 400 men and could not
guard a 12, 000-man garrison with a 30, 000-man reserve. 123
Near 6:30 a.m., Admiral Fenard emerged from Juin's house
with another message for Petain.

He approached Murphy and

Pendar and asked about the first message.
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had given it to others for transmission.

Then he took the

second message. 124
Before Pendar left to send the second message, Murphy
asked him to also send a message to the Allied commander.
Murphy still worried about the absence of American soldiers.
The message, directed to the Eastern Task Force Commander,
read: "It is urgently necessary that some Allied troops
arrive in the city of Algiers as quickly as possible.
Situation well in hand but unwise to let this endure too
long.

,,12s

As Pendar drove toward the house gates, 50 pro-Vichy
forces arrived at Juin's residence.

Armed with machine

guns, these forces, called Gardes Mobiles, quickly chased
away the poorly armed group of rebels. 126

They immediately

placed Murphy under arrest and dragged Pendar from the car.
The two diplomats stood with their hands above their heads
while they were searched and their papers seized. 127

Darlan

and Juin soon left for Fort l' Empereur, where they could
organize the city's defense, but said they would talk with
Murphy after they had more information about the American
landings. 128
124
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Shortly after Darlan arrived at Fort l' Ernpereur to order
resistance to the American landings, across town another
group of Frenchmen planned the continuation of the rebel
uprising.

The Frenchmen at the rebel headquarters anxiously

awaited the arrival of General Giraud.

They had expected

Giraud to land at the Elida airfield, southwest of Algiers,
sometime after 6:30 a.m., but as time went on, it became
clear that he was not coming.

Even if he did arrive, it

would take the general an hour to reach Algiers from Elida
and the situation was rapidly deteriorating.

Gardes Mobiles

and other loyal Vichy troops, now alerted to the rebel
plans, were taking back city offices. 129
After some discussion, the rebels decided to broadcast an
appeal from Giraud to the Algerian public.

"It may rally

the people and save the day before we are overwhelmed by the
mi 1 i tary, " one of the rebe 1 1 eader s argued. 13 0

Two

conspirators immediately left rebel headquarters for a radio
station still in rebel hands.

Impersonating Giraud's voice,

one of the conspirators read the appeal, hastily written at
rebel headquarters, over Algiers radio. 131

The rebel

impersonator claimed that he [Giraud] had arrived to assume
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command of all French forces in North Africa and then urged
the populace to support the American troops.
For the last two years you have scrupulously kept
the terms of the armistice in spite of the
repeated violations of our enemies. Today Germany
and Italy want to occupy North Africa. America
forestalls them and assures us of her loyal and
disinterested support. This is our chance to
revival. We cannot neglect this unexpected
opportunity of recovery.
I take up my action station among you. I ask for
your confidence. You have mine. We have one
passion-France; and one aim-victory. Remember
that the African army holds in its hands the fate
of France. 132
When American and British newspapers began reporting the
African landings the next day, they would focus on the false
Giraud announcement.

In Giraud, the American press saw a

crusading soldier fighting to restore democracy to a captive
France.

In a November 9 profile of Giraud, the Washington

Post referred to the French general as a "legendary figure"
and noted he did not have a command under "Pierre Laval's
Nazi-cherishing regime" which gave him some popularity in
the French resistance. 133
The London Times also praised General Giraud in its
November 9 editorial "Allied Assurances."

The British

newspaper told its readers that Vichy officials would
132
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distort the purpose of the American invasion, "but it is not
to them that Frenchmen can look for deliverance ...

The

voice of the true France was heard in the ringing words of
General Giraud yesterday morning and in those of General De
Gaulle last night." 134
over the next several days, other newspapers published
articles praising Giraud.

On November 10, the New York

Times acknowledged the French general's involvement in the

editorial "The Mediterranean Front."

The Times told readers

that Giraud's support of the North African operation was
"news of first importance."

Giraud, having fought in North

Africa before the war, could give the Allies important
information about the territory they were operating in.

"He

commands enormous prestige in the French Army and his
assumption of leadership of the Free French movement in
North Africa cannot fail to aid our cause enormously." 1 35
The Baltimore Sun also recognized Giraud in its Nov. 12
editorial, "Opportunity Knocks Again For France In Africa."
The Sun argued that the American landings in North Africa
provided the perfect opportunity for the French to abandon
their neutrality and resume the war against the Germans and
Italians.
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continue the war from its colonies because it felt that
Britain would also soon surrender, the Sun said this belief
had been proved wrong.

The U.S. could supply the arms to

Frenchmen interested in using the colonies as a base of
operations against the Axis.

Moreover, the German

occupation of all of France violated the terms of the
armistice, which separated France into German and Vichy
administered areas.

This should, the paper said, change the

minds of Frenchmen, like Petain, who opposed renewing the
war. 136
The great question is whether those who speak for
France in North Africa will join General Giraud
and others in taking full advantage of the
opportunity that presents itself. If they do,
there will be more reason than ever to hope that
the rigors of the extended occupation of
metropolitan France will be of more limited
duration. 137
Walter Lippmann, a long-standing critic of the American
French policy, gave some measure of support to Giraud in his
November 12 column.

Since the Allied invasion had destroyed

Vichy in North Africa, Lippmann argued, the German invasion
of unoccupied France had destroyed Vichy in Europe and a
power vacuum had been created.

The creation of a French

provisional government was needed, not only for the Allies
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to negotiate with, but also to organize armies, levy taxes,
and mobilize French resources: 138
It [the political void] can be filled only by
leaders like General de Gaulle and General Giraud
who are at once French and free and fighting.
Surely it must be the immediate object of our
policy of place at their disposal all the
necessary facilities for prompt agreement on
effective working arrangements. We must then hope
and pray with all earnestness that no other
consideration will enter their minds, or that of
their colleagues, except to seize the glorious
opportunity, which is now theirs, of mobilizing
France for its fullest practical participation in
the war. 139
Aside from building up General Giraud's military and
strategic knowledge, these newspapers point out that Giraud
has no association with Vichy.

In fact, media praised

Giraud precisely because he didn't carry the taint of Vichy
evil.

The British press had condemned the Vichy government

for taking France out of the war and leaving Britain alone.
In America, the press attacked the U.S. government's
continued relations with Vichy because it was a fascistleaning, authoritarian government.
The media's praise for Giraud only reinforced the
public's attitude that World war II was a moral crusade
between democracy and totalitarianism.

By not aligning with

Vichy, Giraud seemed to represent the French ideals of
138
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liberty, equality and fraternity as opposed to Vichy
collaboration.

Each of the newspaper articles mentioning

Giraud favorably contrasted him with Petain, Laval, or other
Vichy officials, or associated him (incorrectly) with de
Gaulle and the Free French movement.
Indeed, during the same time frame that the British and
American media welcomed Giraud, they also welcomed the
passing of the Vichy system.

on November 9, the New York

Times stated that the American landings would inspire the

French people to overthrow the fascist Vichy Government.
Although the "renegade" Laval and the "befuddled" Petain may
confuse the French public and drive Frenchmen into joining
the Axis, "any such success for the betrayers of France will
be of short duration ... the French people will hear and
answer the summons of de Gaulle, the real leader of France
in this hour of crisis.

11140

As further evidence of this public attitude, the Times
made a careful distinction between the Vichy Government and
the French people the very next day. 141
We are not at war
France. war with
obeys his orders,
whom he takes his

140
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To all true Frenchmen, to that vast suffering,
betrayed majority of occupied and unoccupied
France alike, we hold out are hands as friends and
comrades.
We hope to march with them, not against them, and
to see their flag carried with our own when the
troops of the United Nations parade in final
victory. In the light of that hope we fight in
Africa and we dismiss an Ambassador whose
instructions, whether or not he wished them so,
came to him, via Vichy, from Berlin. 142
However much British and American public opinion
disapproved of Vichy, on the morning of November 8 it was
still very much a force for the Allies to reckon with.

In

Algiers, Murphy and Pendar were Vichy prisoners, but Pendar
still had Darlan's second message to Petain.

Admiral Fenard

arranged to have Pendar deliver Darlan's second message to
Petain to the Admiralty.

After the Admiralty's commanding

officer confirmed that the message had originated from
Darlan, it was forwarded to Petain. 143
received Petain's reply.

"I have received your message via

the Admiralty," Marshal Petain said.
are there.

By 9 a.m., Darlan

You may act and inform me.

"I am happy that you
You know you have my

full confidence." 144
By the time Darlan received Petain's message, Vichy
troops had reestablished control in Algiers.
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Mobile had scattered the French rebels and taken back key
city buildings, but Darlan knew American troops waited just
outside the city.

In another message to Petain sent shortly

before noon, Darlan said the city could fall to the Allies
by nightfall. 145
At 4:30 p.m., Juin learned that the Americans were near
the city.

He could either abandon the city, leaving Darlan

to deal with the political situation, or stay and be
surrounded.

Darlan phoned to ask Juin to stay in the city

and negotiate a cease-fire for Algiers.

"There is no point

having people killed uselessly," Darlan said.
prolong a resistance which is hopeless."

"Let us not

Juin now ordered

all French forces to withdraw toward Fort l' Empereur in
order to avoid conflict with the American troops entering
the city. 146

Juin then called Murphy and asked him to

contact the American commander, General Charles Ryder, to
tell him that the French were prepared to surrender the
city. 147

The surrender of North Africa
Eisenhower sent Gen. Mark Clark to Algiers the next day,
November 9, 1942.
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Algiers shortly after 9:00 a.m., Eisenhower told Clark to
come to terms with Darlan.

If the French admiral was

willing to cooperate, the North African campaign would
become infinitely easier.

Roosevelt and Churchill had

essentially sent Eisenhower to North Africa with a small,
untrained army.

It would be difficult for the Allied forces

to fight both the French and the Axis forces.

If the

Spanish decided to intervene in North Africa on the Axis
side, then the Allied operation would be over.
In order to offset these military disadvantages, and to
save lives, Eisenhower was prepared to take advantage of the
opportunity Darlan presented.

Darlan held an established

position in the Vichy government, as commander in chief of
the French armed forces, and could legally order French
soldiers to join the Allies.

Any soldier following a

similar order from Giraud, who had no such authority, would
be committing mutiny. 148
General Ryder first met Darlan at the admiral's
headquarters, at the Hotel Saint-Georges, at 8 p.m. on
November 8.

Juin, Fenard and various other French officers

also arrived for the meeting.
however, arrived late.

The American contingent,

Murphy first had a long meeting with

the French resistance leaders.

The conspirators had placed

all their hopes on Giraud, who had still not arrived, but
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now the Americans were negotiating with Darlan.

Moreover,

many of the French rebels were now in jail or feared
retribution. 149

Murphy had to deal with these issues and

discuss what actions the conspirators should take next.
As a result, Murphy and Ryder did not arrive at the Hotel
Saint-Georges until 10 p.m., but the parties wasted no time.
Ryder immediately suggested that Darlan extend the ceasefire to all of North Africa, but the admiral hesitated,
saying he needed to consult Petain before making commitments
outside of Algiers.

Ryder also claimed that he could not

speak without first consulting General Clark.

Ryder wanted

to settle the Algerian situation and move his men into
Tunisia, leaving Algiers under French administration.
"Under what government?" Darlan asked.

Ryder replied that

he expected to find an insurrectionary, anti-Vichy
government but further developments had to wait until the
arrival of General Clark. 150

And so November 8 closed

without any real progress toward a total surrender of French
North Africa.
Despite the lack of a firm cease-fire agreement, the
Allied press treated the opening of the North African front
positively.

For the Americans, nearly a year had passed

between the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, and the
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subsequent U.S. entrance into the war, and the beginning of
any significant campaign against the Germans and Italians.
While the media did not pretend that the North African
landings represented the opening of a major front against
the Axis, they did recognize it as an important first step
toward Allied landings in Europe.

The Allied media also

recognized how the Africa landings reassured an anxious
world about the American and English commitment to the war.
The language the media used to frame this campaign
illustrates how deeply the public had come to perceive World
war II as a moral conflict.
The Washington Post in its November 9 editorial "The Hour
Has Struck" graphically comments on the fighting in French
North Africa.

"At last the hour has arrived for the stroke

of the moment against the monstrous tyranny which has set
the entire world in flames," the Post wrote.

"The fear had

been growing that the hour would never come. " 151
The Post told its readers that the landings in North
Africa represented the first time that viewers can discern a
coordinated effort by the Allies to fight the Axis.

Until

this point, the paper claims, it appeared as if the United
Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were
fighting isolated, defensive wars.

But the African campaign

illustrated the efforts of the "grand alliance" to attack
151
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the Axis on one front in order to aid an ally on another
front. 152
The timing is perfect. As Stalin said on Friday,
Hitler's time schedule has been thrown completely
out of kilter. That schedule-revised after the
failure to capture Moscow last year-called weeks
ago for the annihilation of the Red Army. But the
Red Army is still intact. It is not only intact:
it is also strong enough at any time to go on a
counter-offensive in concert with the Allied plan
in Africa. 153
The New York Times offered a similar evaluation in its
November 9 editorial "The Great Offensive."

The Times tells

readers that history will record November 7 as the beginning
of the Allied offensive against the Axis powers.

Despite

the dangers the North African landings may bring, "we know
now that we are no longer merely hitting back on the
defensive."

Moreover, the paper says, the North African

campaign proves three things: that America is prepared to
sacrifice its own for an Allied victory, is strong enough to
fight two fronts at once (in Europe and in the Pacific), and
has enough men stationed in Europe to open a major
offensive. 154
The impact of these moral factors will reach far
and wide. From this demonstration of our power
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and our purpose the conquered peoples of Europe,
impatient for the day when they can turn with fury
on the Nazi beast, will draw fresh strength and
courage. Our Russian allies, fighting superbly,
and for the most part alone, through so many
months, will see in the arc that reaches from
North Africa to Southern Europe the shape of the
Second Front which they have urged us to
establish. The few still hesitant and still
skeptical nations in our own hemisphere will find
fresh evidence of the strength of our commitment
to destro_x the military power of Hitler's
Germany. 1
In London, predictably, the African landings were also
warmly welcomed.

Not only did capturing French North Africa

give the Allies access to the Mediterranean, shorting supply
routes to posts throughout the British Empire, but it also
placed the German Africa Corps between two Allied armies.
The American army in West Africa and the British army in
Egypt, the London Times tells readers, now opens the
prospect of total defeat of the German forces in Africa:
The prospect is now opening of establishing allied
power along the whole coast of North Africa, so as
to confront, across a comparatively narrow sea,
all the southern shores of enslaved Europe, and
threaten by many possible routes the ultimate
blows at the heart of Germany. 156
In the Soviet Union, it was reported that the news of the
North African landings provided a moral boost for Red Army
troops.

Several days after the landings, Stalin wrote to an
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A.P. correspondent and expressed his pleasure with the North
African campaign: 157
The African campaign refutes again the skeptics
who affirm that the Anglo-American leaders cannot
organize a serious war campaign. No one but first
rate organizers could carry on such serious war
operations as the successful landings in North
Africa across the ocean, as the quick occupation
of harbors and wide territories and as smashing of
the Italo-German armies being effected so
masterfully. 158
While the media was busy congratulating the American
forces in Africa, negotiations for a cease-fire in French
North Africa continued in Algiers.

Ryder resumed

discussions with Darlan at 5:30 p.m. on November 9.

The

meeting had been scheduled for earlier in the day, but
Ryder, hoping that General Clark would arrive, kept
postponing the meeting.

Finally Ryder decided he could wait

no longer and returned to the Hotel Saint-Georges. 159
Once at Darlan's headquarters, Ryder presented the
admiral with two armistice agreements.

One was lenient,

while the other called for disarming the French soldiers and
confining them to barracks.

Juin, who was also in

attendance, argued that French soldiers would need their
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weapons in order to defend themselves against the Germans.
One French general offered to confine his troops to quarters
if Ryder allowed the soldiers to keep their weapons.

Darlan

liked the suggestion and added that all munitions, except
those needed "for the maintenance of order," be placed under
American guard. 160
This seemed to indicate that some progress was being
made, but Ryder needed Darlan to commit to a cease-fire in
all of North Africa.

To force the issue, Ryder proposed

letting French ships fly their own flag and retaining the
regular North African administration.

Darlan immediately

asked if the U.S. was prepared to recognize Vichy authority
in North Africa.

Again, Ryder said he could not answer

without consulting General Clark. 161
Luckily, during Ryder's meeting with Darlan, Clark
finally landed in North Africa.

Upon arrival, the general

immediately went to the Hotel Saint-Georges, arriving only
an hour after the conference had begun. 162
Clark tried to get a cease-fire by claiming that 150,000
Allied troops were ashore.

Actually, only 3,400 soldiers

had landed by this time. 163

In any case, Darlan and Juin

would not submit and complained that the landings had taken
160
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them by surprise.

Darlan also stated that had the Americans

waited two weeks, a Vichy proposal securing French
cooperation in a similar operation would have been
advanced. 164
Since Clark felt that no serious options had been
advanced he broke off discussions for the evening, proposing
another session in the morning.

The Americans did not take

the manila envelope containing the harsher of the two
armistice agreements with them.

After studying it, Darlan

asked the opinion of the assembled officers.

The staff told

the admiral that French resistance was futile and urged him
to accept the lenient terms.

At 8:30 p.m., Darlan sent a

cable to Petain notifying the Marshal of the situation.
Negotiations between Clark and Darlan resumed at 10:00
a.m. the next morning.

As Darlan pretended to review the

armistice terms (which he already knew), Murphy said, "Time
is pressing, General Clark intends to settle the political
question.

Are you ready, Admiral, to have hostilities cease

in North Africa?"

Darlan explained that he had sent

messages to Petain and would have to wait for instructions.
This angered Clark who told Darlan, through an interpreter:
Tell him that Petain is nothing in our young
lives. He has today broken relations with the
united States and declared this landing as an act
hostile to France. He ordered resistance. As far
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as we're concerned, we don't recognize any
authority of Petain in North Africa. 165
But Darlan still refused to sign an armistice.

The

admiral offered to send another message to Vichy but Murphy
demanded a settlement in 30 minutes.
have Giraud sign the armistice.

Clark threatened to

"Do you want Giraud without

the Army or the Army without Giraud?" Darlan asked.

Juin

explained that Giraud had no power or influence in North
Africa; the French generals still organizing resistance in
Morocco and Tunisia would not follow Giraud.

"In that

case," Murphy told Darlan, "General Clark is going to find
it necessary to take you under his protection. " 166
Clark rose to end the meeting but Juin begged for five
minutes alone with Darlan.
delegation left the room.

Clark agreed and the American
Eight minutes later Fenard

emerged from the room to announce that Darlan had agreed to
surrender North Africa.

The Americans re-entered the room

and found Darlan writing a message ordering the various
French military chiefs in North Africa to end hostilities
with the Americans. 167

Darlan told Clark:

In the name of the marshal, I [Darlan] assume
authority in North Africa. The present military
chiefs retain their commands and the political
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structure and administration remain intact. No
chanies may be effected until further orders from
me.16
Darlan notified Vichy of his decision at once.

Petain

initially approved of Darlan's actions, but the Germans had
intercepted Darlan's telegram and intended to force Petain
to repudiate Darlan.

The Vichy Premier, Pierre Laval, was

in Germany to meet with Hitler when the Allied invasion of
North Africa occurred.

When shown the telegram, Laval

immediately called Petain and threatened to resign if Petain
supported Darlan.

Fearing German reprisal, Petain

disavowed Darlan on the grounds he was a prisoner and named
General Auguste Paul Nogues, the resident-general in
Morocco, commander-in-chief of North Africa.

At the same

time, Petain sent a second message to Darlan through secret
channels.

This message expressed the marshal's approval of

Darlan' s actions. 169
The news of Darlan's removal from office was made public
before Petain's secret message arrived.

Clark returned to

the Hotel Saint-Georges to ensure Darlan's continued
cooperation.

But Darlan claimed he would have to cancel the

armistice. 17 ° Clark threatened to arrest Darlan and his
staff but Darlan still would not commit.
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received Petain's secret message and decided to let the
cease-fire stand. 171
The events of the next day, November 11, seemed to remove
any doubts from Darlan's mind.

Hitler ordered the German

armies to march into unoccupied France.

By that afternoon,

Darlan released a statement claiming that the Germans had
broken the armistice and had taken Petain prisoner. 172

Since

Darlan was "faithful to the marshal's inner thoughts, " 173 he
would assume the powers of government in Petain's name.
Darlan reaffirmed the cease-fire orders and urged the French
officials in Tunisia to resist German landings (the Axis had
begun sending men and materials to Tunisia as early as
November 9 ) . 174
Nogues arrived from Morocco in the afternoon of the
following day, November 12, and proceeded to Fenard's villa,
where Darlan still resided.

Seeing that Darlan was free to

act on his own, Nogues restored full command to the admiral.
At 6:00 p.m., Darlan, Nogues, and the other French
principals again met Clark at the Hotel Saint-Georges.
While Nogues expressed his relief that the fighting was
over, he only wanted to grant the Americans the right of
passage through Morocco.
171
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emissary back to Vichy to determine if the marshal wished
the North African army to join the Allied cause.

"Please

impress it upon General Nogues, once and for all," Clark
said to Pendar, who was acting as interpreter, "that there
can be no question of communicating with Vichy.
broken relations with that government.

We have

In our eyes it no

longer exists." 175
Nogues turned to leave, but Darlan held him in place.
Darlan requested a private meeting between himself, Nogues
and Clark.

Once alone, Nogues insisted that Giraud be left

out of any further arrangements.
Giraud," Nogues said.

"There was a General

"There is no more."

Clark,

increasing exasperated by the changing French attitude, read
an ultimatum from Eisenhower.

If the French did not come

quickly to terms, the Americans would either put Giraud in
full command of North Africa or rule by military decree. 176
Clark then demanded to reread the ultimatum with Giraud
present.

When Giraud entered the room with his hand out,

Nogues placed his behind his back and said, "I will not
speak to a rebel general."
jour,

11

Unwittingly, he then said, "Bon

and then muttered "traitre.

11

At this point, Juin

spoke up, "Assez de votre sale politique.
fight the Germans."
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We are going to

Nogues then agreed to go halfway toward
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meeting the American demands.

While still claiming the

French couldn't join the Allied cause without some period of
neutrality first, he suggested that Giraud lead a volunteer
corps to fight with the Allies.
but Clark decided to end it.

Again the French argued,

Clark promised to recognize

Darlan as the chief political official over North Africa and
Nogues as the chief political official in Morocco. 177
The leaders of the North African rebels-Jacques LemaigreDubreuil, Jacques Saint-Hardouin, and Jean Rigault-arrived
at Murphy's office early on Friday, November 13.

They

argued that the Americans had disregarded their previous
promises to Giraud in favor of making a deal with Darlan.
They demanded that Giraud become commander of the armed
forces to balance Darlan's political power.

Murphy took the

group to see Clark, who claimed he had no objection to their
proposal.

But after his struggle to get the French to agree

to the current terms, Clark said the French needed to work
the matter out among themselves.

Moreover, because

Eisenhower was on his way to Algiers, the matter had to be
decided that morning. 178
The French rebel leaders went to the Hotel Saint-Georges
in one last attempt to bring the various factions together.
Once there, they encountered not only General Giraud, but
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General Nogues and General Juin.
Juin to soothe the waters.

Dubreuil quickly asked

"Come, come, mon general," Juin

said to Nogues, "we can't abandon a five-star comrade with
such a tiny command.
march together.

It's a question of France.

Let us all

I am ready to place myself at Giraud's

orders . " 179
By now Nogues not only had time to calm down, but had
seen Petain's secret messages to Darlan expressing the
marshal's approval of the admiral's actions.

Nogues said he

would support handing Giraud command of the army if three
conditions were met: that de Gaulle never set foot in North
Africa, that Giraud recognize Darlan's authority, and that
Giraud hold his command in Petain's name.

Giraud agreed.

A

messenger hurried to Clark and told him, "Everything is set.
They all agree. Giraud has given up his corps of volunteers
and assumes command of the Army.
neutral.

She is with the Allies."

France is no longer
Clark happily drove out

to the Maison Blanche airport to meet Eisenhower.

He could

tell his commander that he had succeeded in his mission; he
had secured French cooperation. 180
After lunch, Clark took Eisenhower to the Hotel SaintGeorges where the commander-in-chief discussed the current
military and political situation with Clark and his staff.
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Murphy arrived with a copy of the Clark-Darlan agreement
after the meeting had begun.

In effect, the agreement gave

the Allies control of airports, harbors, port defenses and
fortifications.

The agreement also gave the Allies broad

emergency powers in case of social breakdown and disorder.
In return, the Americans recognized the current political
structure and promised to supply food to the North African
colonies. 181
Eisenhower could have vetoed the agreement.

By this

time, Allied troops occupied key positions in French North
Africa and many competent Gaullists in England could have
administered the colonies.

But Murphy claimed that only

Darlan and the Vichyities could ensure order in the French
colonies.

In addition, Darlan seemed most likely to bring

the port of Dakar in French west Africa over to the Allied
side.

Most importantly, Eisenhower needed to move into

Tunisia to deal with the massing Axis troops and Rommel's
Afrika Korps.

He couldn't afford to leave troops behind to

secure the rear. 182
Eisenhower asked Murphy for advice but the diplomat now
seemed reluctant to give it.
become a military one.
answer," Murphy said.
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"The whole matter has now

You will have to give the final
Eisenhower accepted the agreement on

77
the basis that, "we [the Allies] have no legal or other
right arbitrarily to establish ... a puppet government of our
own choosing."

In stating this position, Eisenhower

conveniently forgot his own plans to establish an Americansupported government headed by Giraud. 183
Darlan and the other French commanders (including Giraud,
Nogues, and Juin) arrived at the Hotel Saint-Georges at 2:00
p.m.

Eisenhower informed the group that he had accepted the

Clark-Darlan agreement and as the representative of the
British and American governments, he acknowledged Darlan as
the highest civil authority in North Africa.

Eisenhower

said he had but one demand, that the French fully join the
Allied cause and attack the Germans.

Darlan agreed but then

said he also had one demand, that metropolitan France be
liberated and reconstructed.

Eisenhower, of course, agreed

but said he expected French help in liberating France. 184
And so the agreement between Eisenhower and Darlan was
approved.

That evening, Darlan began issuing orders as

Marshal Petain's successor.

As agreed, he proclaimed all

French North African territories in a state of war against
Germany and Italy since they had broken the Armistice
agreement and invaded Unoccupied France. 185
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Meanwhile, Eisenhower had flown back to Gibraltar to send
a message notifying the Combined Chiefs of Staff about the
arrangements with Darlan.

This message alarmed the ccs,

particularly the British.

Many of the British officers felt

it was morally wrong to cut deals with men who collaborated
with Hitler, as Darlan had.

Many of those who had sided

with Churchill early in the struggle against fascism asked
the prime minister, "Is this then what we are fighting
for?,, 106
But the Darlan Deal also raised political considerations.
Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement had been left out
of the planning for the North African landings because of
local sentiment, and because President Roosevelt disliked
him.

Giraud was chosen as the Allied point man for the

North African operation precisely because he had no Vichy
connections.

Churchill felt he could convince de Gaulle to

support Giraud, but de Gaulle would never support Darlan,
who was an outspoken critic of the Free French movement. 187
Not long after Eisenhower had notified the ccs of the
North African arrangement, he was informed of the British
reaction.

Eisenhower knew he had to justify the Darlan

Deal; if he did not, President Roosevelt could dissolve the
agreement.

In addition, there was the question of the
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Soviets.

Would Stalin conclude that the U.S. and the U.K.

where prepared to cut deals with Nazi collaborators, leaving
the Soviet Union to fight Germ.any alone? 188

Eisenhower's

full report, sent the morning of November 14, provides
excellent insight into the Supreme Commander's thinking.
Despite American efforts to minimize French resistance to
the Allied landings, Eisenhower claimed the Vichy regime was
well entrenched in North Africa.

The entire French

resistance had been based on the belief that Petain opposed
the invasion.

"The military and naval leaders, as well as

the civil governors, agree that only one man has the obvious
right to assume the mantle of Petain and that man is Admiral
Darlan," Eisenhower argued. 189
By securing a cease-fire through Darlan, Eisenhower
wrote, the American goals could be advanced more quickly.
Continued French resistance would only delay the American
advance on the German lines in Tunisia.

In addition,

keeping the existing French administration intact meant that
few Allied troops would be left behind to preserve order.
"In Morocco alone," Eisenhower said, "General Patton
estimates 60,000 Allied troops would be required to control
the Moroccan tribes.
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I assure you that only after incessant examination
of the important factors have these agreements
been made. They are essential in order to get on
with the military objectives against the Axis and
advance the interests of the Allies in winning
this war. 191
Eisenhower then asked that a public statement be withheld
for a short while.

Giraud had proved unpopular among French

officers in North Africa.

It was thought best to let the

French deal with the issue before the Allies made an
announcement. 192
Upon receiving Eisenhower's report, the ccs forwarded it
to President Roosevelt, then at his home in Hyde Park, New
York.

According to Office of war Information official

Robert Sherwood, who was present when the president received
the report, "Roosevelt was deeply impressed by it and, as he
read it with the same superb distribution of emphasis that
he used in his public speeches, he sounded as if he were
making an eloquent plea for Eisenhower before the bar of
history. " 193
Eisenhower had also sent the report to Prime Minister
Churchill.

"Please be assured," Eisenhower prefaced the

message, "that I have too often listened to your sage advice
to be completely handcuffed and blindfolded by all the
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slickers with which this part of the world is so thickly
populated."
Churchill too was impressed by Eisenhower's reasoning. 194
And so the Supreme Commander secured his needed support in
the upper echelons of the Allied leadership.

The next day,

November 15, Darlan made his public proclamation and the
public learned the full extent of the Clark-Darlan Deal:
Since the invasion of the free zone against which
he protested as solemnly as circumstances
permitted, the Marshal finds it impossible to make
known his intimate thoughts to the French. All
means of communication are, moreover, under German
control. The Marshal telegraphed me on November
9th that he was satisfied with my presence in
Africa. He gave me renewed assurance of his
complete confidence. On November 11th, believing
me deprived of my liberty he delegated authority
to General Nogues. On November 13th General
Nogues recognizing my complete liberty of action
returned to me, with the approval of the Marshal,
the powers which had devolved on him. Under these
conditions I declare: Legionnaires, officials of
all ranks, officers, non-commissioned officers,
and privates of the army, navy and air-force of
Africa who have taken the oath of fidelity to the
Marshal should consider that they are faithful to
the Marshal in executing my orders.
I take upon myself sole responsibility for this
decision, which has only the single object of
assuring the good of the Empire and the national
unity.
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I have designated as military Commander a great
soldier, General Henri Giraud, who has always
served France with honor.
ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET DARLAN.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PUBLIC REACTS

Until the time of Eisenhower's agreement with Darlan, the
press coverage of the North African campaign had been
overwhelmingly positive. As seen in the editorials covering
the first few days after the North African landings, the
Allied media routinely characterized the campaign as proof
of the United States' commitment to the defeat of
dictatorial Axis regimes, the restoration freedom and hope
to occupied nations, and support of other allied nations.
The news of the Darlan Deal quickly ended these favorable
characterizations.
The American and British press immediately characterized
the Darlan Deal as an abandonment of the principles embodied
in Roosevelt's Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter.
These statements were supposed to provide the moral reasons
for which the war was being fought.

Instead of discrediting

fascists by defeating them militarily, the Allies were now
reaching accommodations with them.

To the press, this

smacked of the appeasement policies the British and French
governments had followed prior to the war.

Then, granting

Hitler many of his territorial and political desires, no
matter how illegal or unprincipled those desires might be,
the Allies had sought to prevent war.

84
These arguments appeared on the editorial pages of many
American newspapers between November 12 and November 18.

In

a sampling of 12 major American newspapers, the Darlan Deal
was discussed in a total of 12 editorials, syndicated
columns and letters to the editor.

Ten of these opinion

pieces expressed outright opposition to the Darlan Deal;
only two opinion pieces portrayed the Darlan Deal favorably.
Similar negative feelings were expressed towards Darlan
himself.

In the same 12 newspapers, 14 columns, editorials

or letters to the editor appeared which directly discussed
Admiral Darlan.

All 14 of these opinion pieces portrayed

Darlan unfavorably.
Darlan had not only collaborated with Hitler, but he also
helped establish an authoritarian system within his own
country.

The Darlan Deal potentially set an important

precedent: that collaborators and fascists who came over to
the Allied side would be rewarded.

Eventually, these

collaborators might set up fascist regimes after the war,
allowing the immoral practices of these governments to
continue.
The New York Post argued these very points in its lead
editorial on Monday, November 16, the day after the
announcement of the Eisenhower-Darlan Deal.

The Post argued

that the United States must immediately dispose of Darlan,
who must not hold a position of importance, even
temporarily.

Supporting Darlan threatened to undermine the
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Allies' moral position.

The Allies advocated a complete

destruction of fascism, which they had begun to pursue by
invading Africa.

The invasion destroyed the Vichy

administration in North Africa and crippled it in
metropolitan France.

By supporting Darlan, America showed a

weakness of purpose: 196
We have made a magnificent start in Africa. As
word of it sifts through the nets of nazidom it
brings hope and resolution to millions. They must
not hear that in our next move we got off on the
wrong foot, that we were marching in step with
such a one as Darlan.
Down with Darlan! 197
The Christian Science Monitor discussed the moral
implications of the Darlan Deal in a November 16 editorial
titled "Darlan."

On the surface, the Darlan Deal seemed to

sacrifice many basic principles, the paper said.

The French

admiral, as a member of the Vichy Government, supported a
system of government directly opposed to the American one.
How can the Vichy order be so quickly dispelled?
Is there no moral principle in this struggle? Are
we going to take in any turncoat Fascist and
reward him? If this is political warfare, what
does it do to those Frenchmen who have held the
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front lines of resistance to Hitler and his
puppets ? 198
After raising these questions, the Christian Science
Monitor then urged its readers to refrain from judgment

until all the facts about the North African situation had
become known.

For instance, the paper said, perhaps Darlan

broke with Vichy and had gone to Africa for refuge.
Perhaps, Vichy planned to re-enter the war, as Petain's
statement that Germany had broken the armistice suggested,
and Darlan was only carrying out the marshal's wishes. 199
No one can morally support any sort of relations with
Darlan, the paper argued, but war is "seldom a matter of
simple morality ... it often appears to offer only a choice
between evils."

Until the reasons for Eisenhower's

agreement with Darlan are explained, one cannot yet tell if
the deal was justified. 200

Despite the paper's reluctance to

take a position, it certainly helped legitimize public
concern by claiming the moral issues involved were truly
important.
The strongest criticism that emerged in the days
immediately following the announcement came from the
political arena.
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challenger, Wendell Willkie, intended to publicly condemn
the arrangement during a speech at the New York Herald
Tribune Forum on Current Problems on November 16. 201

When

Willkie released the text of his speech to the press, it
contained a harsh protest of negotiations with fascists:
Shall we in America be quiet, for instance, when
our leaders after promising freedom to the French
people, put into control over them the very man
who has helped to enslave them? Shall we be quiet
when we see our government's long appeasement of
Vichy find its logical conclusion in our
collaboration with Darlan, Hitler's tool? Such
collaboration outrages the spirit of free people
everywhere, whatever expediency dictated it. I
tell you we cannot fight this war in silence,
whatever our experts say. Because if we fight in
silence, those same experts will, in the end, even
winnin~ the war, win nothing but blood and
ashes. 02
Before Willkie could deliver the speech, however,
Secretary of war Henry Stimson called and asked him to
remove any reference to Darlan.

The request angered

Willkie, but although his speech had already been released,
he only condemned the "State Department's long appeasement
of Vichy.
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Even without the direct reference to Darlan, Willkie
criticized American North African policy.

Throughout the

speech, however, Willkie made reference to the need to
define and assure adherence to the moral principles of the
war, such as those in the Atlantic Charter.

To let such

matters rest until after the war risked losing the very
things the United States fought for.

"Even if war leaders

apparently agree upon principles," Willkie said, "when they
come to the peacetime-they make their own interpretations of
their previous declarations.

11204

Since the Atlantic Charter committed the Allies to
destroying fascist regimes, and the united States had
recognized a fascist government in North Africa to gain
military advantage, the united States had reinterpreted its
own declarations of principle.

Willkie had criticized the

Darlan Deal without mentioning it.
More newspapers joined in the attack on the Darlan Deal
on November 17.

As in the previous days' editorials, the

newspapers based their opposition to the Eisenhower-Darlan
agreement on moral grounds.

The Chicago Sun, in the

editorial "The Cloud Over Africa," argued that deals with
fascists threatened to break the anti-Nazi alliance apart.
All the Allied groups that had fought with the U.S. against
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the fascists must now wonder how much faith they could place
in American statements.
In this Africa affair we have treated with great
disdain the Fighting French forces throughout the
world, the Fighting French National Committee and
its head, General de Gaulle, in London-men who
have unfalteringly maintained the fight against
Hitler since the fall of France. Having assured
the world only a few days ago that at last we were
really through with Vichy, we have set up what may
turn out to be a new Vichy regime in Africa.
General de Gaulle expresses the suspicion of many
when he divorces the Fighting French from
negotiations with Darlan and warns that a new
Vichy regime will not be accepted by his movement.
There are here seeds, moreover, of future deep
impairment of American-Soviet relations. Russia
has officially recognized the Fighting French
National Committee. If we persist in fostering a
reactionary French regime headed by a Vichyite,
there is reason to expect that within France-where
sentiment is overwhelmingly anti-Vichy-we shall
produce a swing toward Communism. The menace to
American-Russian teamwork need not be labored
here ... 205
A milder form of criticism emerged from the New York
Herald Tribune.

In its editorial "Patience and

Understanding," the Herald Tribune argued that Eisenhower
was justified in negotiating with Darlan, who they labeled
"the arch-Anglophobe, the collaborator, third in rank among
the men of Vichy." By doing so, Eisenhower had been able to
free North Africa and, possibly, other Vichy colonies. 206
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the same time, the Herald recognized that deals with
fascists might undermine the Allied commitment to the war.
To redeem itself, the paper seemed to say, the U.S. should
formally embrace the Free French.

To the paper, de Gaulle

and the Free French, who had continued the war against
Hitler after the French defeat, represented the struggle to
preserve democratic forms.

This would reassure all Allies

that the U.S. remained dedicated to preserving democracy.
At the same time the De Gaullists deserve at least
equal consideration from the American government.
They represent more than a policy of unceasing
resistance to Hitler-great though the benefits
which the United Nations have already derived from
that policy may be. They also stand for the best
of the old France, the real France, the France of
liberty, equality and fraternity to which
President Roosevelt appealed as the Americans went
into North Africa ... While pursuing the immediate
military aims of the Allied forces in North
Africa, it is essential that the Fighting French
in London be kept informed of those aims and the
measures being taken to realize them. The
ultimate objective of the Allies must be to enlist
all patriotic Frenchmen in the war, and that
cannot be attained by fostering doubts among those
who have never laid down their arms. If patience
and understanding are demanded of the Fighting
French, they are obviously entitled to receive
frankness and cordiality in return. 207
The Minneapolis Morning Tribune was more conspicuous in
what it didn't say than it what it did.

In its November 17

editorial "What Darlan Means," the Morning Tribune did not
offer any explanations or reasons to support Eisenhower's
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deal with Darlan.

Indeed, the paper had harsh words for

Darlan.
Though there isn't any profitable point in
accepting him [Darlan] as a flaming convert to the
cause of the United Nations. That he is not, and
it is doubtful if he ever will be. He is a
Frenchman who never will forgive Germany nor
Britain, and a European who always will be able to
keep his affection for the United States within
reasonable bounds. 208
Instead, the paper's editorial sounds like an attempt to
make something good out of a bad situation.

Aside from the

negatives that Darlan brought with him, the fact that the
admiral joined the Allied cause pointed to an even greater
victory, one that should have rallied the Allied spirit:
While all this is not particularly flattering, his
[Darlan's] accession to our ranks can only mean
one thing and that is that he has come to the
conclusion that Hitler's star is on the wane and
that it is only a matter of time until it will
sink below the horizon. This judgment, which is
not appreciably affected by any sentimental
considerations, is all the more encouraging
because it is devoid of wishful thinking.
Darlan, of course, has a decided advantage over
Petain when it comes to any expression of honest
views, in that he is without the reach of the
Nazis. The aged marshal, who has not displayed
any of the Darlan bitterness, might talk in
different terms if he were in Africa instead of in
the hands of the Hitlerites. The trend of events
in Tunis and Algeria suggest this. 209
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The San Francisco Chronicle also gave some measure of
support while issuing a warning.

In its November 17

editorial "Darlan," the paper stated that issues surrounding
Vichy have never been more unclear.

Although the public

must assume that Eisenhower "has reason for what he is doing
with Darlan and the others" the Allies should not trust the
assurances of any former Vichy officials.

The Chronicle

cited the French release of $200 million of Belgian gold to
the Germans on November 6, before the North African
invasion, as proof of Vichy collaboration with the enemy. 210
If the French Government sought to support Nazi ideals, why
should the Americans expect that Vichy officials would now
support Allied ideals?
There must be some significance in the reported
arrival in Algiers of former Premier Etienne
Flandin and former Minister of the Interior Pierre
Pucheu, yet this is confusing. Flandin has been
amongst the appeasers. Do they think the American
horse is the one to back now or are they up to
something else? 211
The New York Times seized on the Darlans deal's potential
threat to the anti-Nazi alliance in its November 17
editorial "Our French Policy."

The Times admitted that

there were many reasons for the public to be confused.

The

Free French, who never surrendered to Hitler, had not been
21011
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involved in the North African campaign.

Instead, the U.S.

had seemingly propped up Darlan "until a week ago the
colleague of Laval."

This gave the appearance of

legitimizing fascism by negotiating with its agents instead
of supporting the French group primarily opposed to its
existence.

This, the paper said, seems a rebirth of

appeasement. 212
After raising these issues, the Times tells its readers
to refrain from judgment, much as the Christian Science

Monitor did on November 16.

The Times expressed faith that

the U.S. government would soon solve the moral dilemmas
imposed by the Darlan Deal.

No agreement with fascists

could overshadow the Allies' commitment to defeat the Axis.
Whatever obscurities or apparent contradictions
there may be in the present American political
policy in North Africa, we do not for a moment
believe that the course our Government is
following means that we have mistaken our enemies
for friends, or lost interest in the real cause
for which our friends our fighting-namely, the
life of the French Republic. We urge patience,
and confidence, on the part of both the Americans
and of their French colleagues in arms. The
French Republic never had a better friend than the
President who directs our policy in this crisis. 213
More anti-Darlan press appeared on November 18.

The St.

Louis Dispatch, for instance, attacked Darlan directly in
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"Darlan's Latest Flip-Flop."

The paper warned readers of

Darlan's unreliability and encouraged the military to keep a
close watch on the admiral.

That the Dispatch disapproved

of the deal there can be little doubt.

The paper branded

Darlan as a Nazi collaborationist who displayed loose
convictions, a particularly noteworthy attack in a war
fought largely on conviction.
Only a few weeks ago, Admiral Jean Darlan was
among the strongest advocates of French
collaboration with Nazi Germany, and an avowedly
bitter enemy of the British. Now he is cooperating with the American occupying forces in
North Africa, has set himself up as civil
administrator there and has called on the French
fleet to join the Allies.
So the former chief of all Vichy's armed forces
has completed another flip-flop by again going
over to the seemingly winning side. He had
double-crossed his own country by siding with its
conquerors; now he turns around and double-crosses
the Nazis. The slippery Darlan is burning no
bridges behind him, however. He avows his
continued loyalty to Petain, but says the
Marshal's orders must be disregarded "because he
is unable to let the French people know his real
thoughts .... "
Now that this treacherous opportunist has swung
over to the Allied side, in an effort to save his
own skin, he may be of help in keeping the fleet
out of Nazi clutches. Undoubtedly; however, the
Allied commanders are watching him closely while
making use of his services. Darlan's slimy record
shows that he is capable of betraying his new
found friends if events seem to be going against
them. 214
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On November 19, a letter to the editor titled "Darlan and
the Atlantic Charter," appeared in the Minneapolis Star
Journal.

The writer, Frank Adams, questioned the morality

of the Darlan Deal.

He wanted to know how General

Eisenhower explained the principles of the Atlantic Charter
to Darlan and how, in turn, Darlan had the moral authority
to explain them to the French people.
was as abhorrent as Vidkun Quisling.

To the writer, Darlan
Quisling, a former

Norwegian minister of war and Nazi sympathizer, had provided
secret military information to the Nazis which assisted the
German invasion of Norway. 215
If appointing Darlan to the head of the French
North African government will help win the war, I
am for it, but it will take a lot of proving to
make me see it. Anyway, I don't think we are
fighting to restore Quislings in government
positions. 216
A column titled

"Darlan Forte In Africa Is Still

Obscure" appeared in the November 19 issue of the Oregonian.
The columnist, Dorothy Thompson, refused to believe the
Untied States would set up a Vichy government in North
Africa.

If American policy was to promote Roosevelt's Four

Freedoms throughout the world, then all fascist regimes must
be destroyed.
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principles embodied in the Four Freedoms, not building them
up.

To support Darlan would be to ignore the moral

underpinnings of the Four Freedoms.
Vichy France, under the prominent leadership of
Admiral Darlan, was a pallid beige naziism. It
abolished the motto of "liberty, equality and
fraternity"; it destroyed every vestige of popular
government; ... it participated in the deportation
of Jews to Poland; it dissolved trade unions and
suppressed the free press ... it produced armaments
for the German war effort ... and caused the deaths
of an unknown number of Frenchmen and Americans.
Neither freedom of speech, nor freedom from fear
is possible under Vichy leaders. Therefore one
must regard the present political situation as an
interval in an unconsolidated military
situation. 217

Press Reaction in the united Kingdom
Perhaps the deepest criticism of the Darlan Deal
materialized in the United Kingdom.

The deal seemed to

repudiate the meaning of the struggle the British people had
been engaged in for over three long years, even more so for
a nation that had recognized de Gaulle and the Free French.
Darlan represented the epitome of the French defeatism that
had left Britain alone to fight against Hitler.
The London Times addressed these issues in its November
17 editorial "The Destiny of France."

Since the June 1940

French defeat, the paper said, France had fallen into
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"physical and moral prostration."

Marshal Petain had become

a symbol of this hopelessness and passivity.

"He has

offered nothing more than passive resistance, at best, to
the active collaboration with Germany pressed upon France
by ... Laval and others."

Petain had also resisted all

efforts to aid the Allied cause.

This Vichy policy, "with

the undisguised approval of Berlin, has been undermining the
republican traditions of 1789 and after. 11218
Because these policies had split French society, it had
become impossible for the Allies to appoint French groups to
administer freed French territory.

Such a transfer of

authority could only happen if there were "an overwhelming
consensus of opinion among Frenchmen ... on the
representative character of the individual or group
concerned."

In November 1942, that consensus was impossible

at the time.

For this reason, the Western Allies had to

administer French colonies and territories in trust for the
French people.
The Times argued that these were the moral obligations
that the Allies owed the French.

Only the people of a

liberated France, with its institutions of free expression
and democracy restored, could legitimately decide the fate
of France.

The Darlan Deal made the restatement of these

imperatives all the more important.
21811

Significantly, the

The Destiny of France," The Times (London), 17
November 1942, 5.

98

Times contrasted Darlan's experience with that of Giraud,
who never accepted a Vichy position.
Admiral Darlan's services in the restoration of
order and confidence have been accepted by the
allied command. His record since 1940 makes the
choice, to say the least of it, unexpected. But
for the moment his cooperation with General Giraud
{whose unimpeachable record is the subject on this
page this morning) and with General Nogues is
assured. 219
French unity was not needed immediately, the paper said.
What was needed was unified and effective action to defeat
the Axis.

Once this happened, the French people could

choose their own system of government.
The stating of this position was clear.

The Times

claimed that self-determination and liberation must always
be the Allied goal for France.

These were the basic

principles the Allies were fighting for.

Under no

circumstances would the Times condone the recognition of a
neo-Vichy government headed by Darlan or any other fascist.
To recognize any government other than that chosen by the
French people would be counter to the Atlantic Charter's
position of restoring democracy to enslaved peoples.
The Manchester Guardian, in its November 18 editorial,
"The Darlan Mystery," also argued that the Darlan Deal
should not prepare the way for a post-war fascist government
in France.
219
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Darlan's reasons for switching from the Axis to the Allied
camp.

The paper saw one of two possibilities: That Marshal

Petain had sent Darlan to North Africa to establish a proVichy government in the Allied camp, or Darlan could have
come of his own accord, angered by his loss of status at
Vichy.

In either case, a dangerous Vichyite system, in

control of an African empire, survived the war. 220
If a Fascist or semi-Fascist party is built up now
in Northern Africa France may be precipitated at
the peace into a civil war. Just as Petain and
Weygand argued for surrender to Germany in June,
1940, on the ground that if the war went on there
would be a Communist revolution, so again
Frenchman who want France to restore democracy and
take her place on the side of the Atlantic Charter
may be warned that nothing but the rule of this
Fascist party and the preservation of the Vichy
revolution can save France from anarchy ... If
that plot is organized by the men who betrayed
France the bitterness of the struggle that will
follow will be implacable. 221
The same day, a letter to the editor appeared in the
London Times that hinted how deeply the democratic principal

behind the war ran in the public.

The author, D. Saurat,

argued that the Western Allies must assume responsibility
for the liberated French territories.

Delegating

responsibility to the various French groups ran great risks.
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Two great dangers are looming ahead: the
potentiality of civil war among the French, the
disappearance of the democratic principal for the
French ... In de Gaulle's committee, it has not
been found possible to make use of any democratic
principal: the commissaires nationaux are
responsible only to de Gaulle. Darlan, on the
other side, founds his powers on le Marechal, and
therefore is not likely to re-establish
democracy. 222
To preserve democratic forms, the author recommended
calling an assembly of exiled representative Frenchmen, as
General de Gaulle had advocated.

The body would be composed

of members of the French Parliament currently living in
Allied territories as well as distinguished French writers,
diplomats, and administrators of high rank living outside
occupied France.

Although the body would have no real

power, since it wouldn't truly represent France, it would
preserve French democratic forms.
So far we have only generals and admirals speaking
for France. Should they not be the servants of
the State and not its masters? The leaders of the
united Nations are great democrats, they are
negotiating with the generals and admirals. But
in your own words they are responsible to the
people of France. 223
Criticism of the Darlan Deal also appeared in Parliament.
On November 11, King George VI praised the landings in North
Africa as "notable steps towards final victory," in his
222
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annual address to Parliament, written by Churchill's
coalition government. 224

Members of the House of Commons

used the King's reference in order to denounce the Darlan
Deal.

The Darlan issues was raised eight times while the

House debated the King's Speech.
On November 12, even before the Darlan Deal had been
announced, one Member of Parliament, Aneurin Bevan, told the
Commons that the Allies should never negotiate with Admiral
Darlan.

"Admiral Darlan is a bad man; he is a bad man from

whatever point of view you like to regard him. " 225

He

recognized that such negotiations might carry some
advantages, such as saving lives, but the Allies should not
sacrifice their principles for immediate gains.

Instead,

full support should be given to de Gaulle.
He is no longer a man; he is a symbol. Therefore,
I say do not try to put these traitorous
quislings, these rats now leaving the sinking
ship, in place of men who stood staunchly by our
side in our most difficult days. 226
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CHAPTER V
ROOSEVELT'S STATEMENT

The White House rushed to respond to press criticism, but
not always with Eisenhower's best interests in mind.

The

State Department urged Roosevelt to order Eisenhower not to
retain any former Vichy officials "to whom well founded
objections might be taken."

Admiral William D. Leahy, the

former American ambassador to Vichy and then Roosevelt's
chief of staff, stopped the order.

Leahy told Roosevelt

that Eisenhower needed a degree of freedom in order to
accomplish the u. s.' objectives. 227
Secretary of War Harry Stimson demanded more freedom and
support be given to Eisenhower.

He told Roosevelt that the

American people needed to hear a defense of Eisenhower by
the president before criticism of the Darlan Deal would
subside.

Roosevelt was reluctant to make this defense; his

policy of continued relations with Vichy had been widely
criticized but the President had never defended it.

But now

all of the President's major advisors felt a statement was
necessary. 228
Unless Roosevelt said the Darlan Deal did not represent a
sacrifice of American war principles, criticism might
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continue to build.

Possibly, the public might become

disillusioned and support for the war would weaken.
A message Roosevelt received from Churchill on November
17 may have helped convince the President that he needed to
support Eisenhower publically.

In it, the Prime Minister

took the position argued by many of the American and British
newspapers: the Darlan Deal undermined the Allies' position
as the defenders of democracy.
I ought to let you know that very deep currents of
feeling are stirred by the arrangement with
Darlan. The more I reflect upon it the more
convinced I become that it can only be a temporary
expedient justifiable solely by the stress of
battle. We must not overlook the serious
political injury which may be done to our cause,
not only in France but throughout Europe, by the
feeling that we are ready to make terms with the
local quislings. Darlan has an odious record. It
is he who has incalculated in the French Navy its
malignant disposition by promoting his creatures
to command. It is but yesterday that French
sailors were sent to their death against your line
off Casablanca and now, for the sake of power and
office, Darlan plays the turncoat. A permanent
arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a
Darlan government in French North Africa would not
be understood by the great masses of ordinary
people whose simple loyal ties are our strength. 229
The Prime Minister's comments were reinforced by a
message sent on the same day from the British Foreign Office
to its embassy in Washington.

The message spelled out the

official British position that although the Allies might
have to deal with Darlan for military expediency, his role
229
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in the Vichy government made any long-term acceptance
untenable: "There is above all our own moral position ...

We

are fighting for international decency and Darlan is the
antithesis of this.

11230

At any rate Roosevelt agreed that some sort of statement
was called for.

The President asked Milton Eisenhower, an

Office of war Information official and General Eisenhower's
younger brother, for a draft statement.

Roosevelt made

significant changes to the statement, adding the word
"temporary" in a number of places.

The President delivered

the statement at a press conference on November 17. 231
I have accepted General Eisenhower's political
arrangements made for the time being in Northern
and Western Africa.
I thoroughly understand and approve the feeling in
the United States and Great Britain and among all
the other United Nations that in view of the
history of the past two years no permanent
arrangement should be made with Admiral Darlan.
People in the United Nations likewise would never
understand the recognition of a reconstituting of
the Vichy Government in France or in any French
territory.
We are opposed to Frenchmen who support Hitler and
the Axis. No one in our Army has any authority to
discuss the future Government of France and the
French Empire.
The future French Government will be established,
not by any individual in Metropolitan France or
overseas, but by the French people themselves
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after they have been set free by the stress of
battle ....
The present temporary arrangement has accomplished
two military objectives. The first was to save
American and British lives, and French lives on
the other hand.
The second was the vital factor of time. The
temporary arrangement has made it possible to
avoid a "mopping up" period in Algiers and Morocco
which might have taken a month to two to
consummate. Such a period would have delayed the
concentration for the attack from the West on
Tunis, and we hope on Tripoli ....
Admiral Darlan's proclamation assisted in making a
"mopping up" period unnecessary. Temporary
arrangements made with Admiral Darlan apply,
without exception, to the current local situation
only.
I have requested the liberation of all persons in
Northern Africa who had been imprisoned because
they opposed the efforts of the Nazis to dominate
the world, and I have asked for the abrogation of
all laws and decrees inspired by Nazi Governments
or Nazi ideologist. Reports indicate that the
French of North Africa are subordinating all
political questions to the formation of a common
front against the common enemy. 232
By making the statement, Roosevelt argued that dealing
with fascists for military expediency did not weaken the
commitment of the Allies to restoring individual freedoms.
The president used the Darlan issue as an example to
reassure the public that making use of collaborators to
achieve military aims in exchange for reconstituting fascist
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regimes after the war would be a violation of the trust the
people placed in their leaders.
The President's statement seemed to have a calming effect
on the media.

Many newspapers now argued that Roosevelt's

statement confirmed that the Allies were still dedicated to
the principles for which the war was being fought.

They

also voiced optimism that the French admiral would be
eventually removed from his position in North Africa.
In effect, Roosevelt's statement redirected the focus of
public's anger.

With the moral justification of the war

reaffirmed and the Darlan Deal justified as a life saving
measure, the press no longer had any reason to directly
attack the bargain.

In a sense, Roosevelt had given it a

moral justification of its own, saving lives.
This shift in the editorial stance of the American
newspapers can clearly be seen in a sampling of 17 major
American newspapers between November 19 and November 22.
Before Roosevelt's statement, the majority of opinion pieces
that discussed the Darlan Deal opposed it.

But after the

President's statement this changed; of 23 syndicated
columns, editorials or letters to the editor, 19 now
portrayed the Darlan Deal favorably.
But the concept of negotiating with collaborators and
fascists continued to be unpopular.

The press continued to

voice displeasure by portraying Admiral Darlan as extremely
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untrustworthy because of his association with French Vichy
Government and its collaboration with Nazi Germany.
Evidence of the public's continued refusal to accept
Darlan can also be found in the November 19 to November 22
sampling of 17 American newspapers.

While the majority of

editorials and letters to the editor were now offering
support for the Darlan Deal, the number of negative
portrayals of Admiral Darlan only increased.

In 22

syndicated columns, editorials or letters to the editor that
expressed opinions about Admiral Darlan, not one offered a
favorable evaluation.
The press also praised the public for questioning the
ethics of the Darlan Deal.

The public concern, as reflected

in the press, indicated that the citizens of the Allied
nations opposed Fascism of any type.

The press argued that

the Darlan incident proved the public understood that
liberal western beliefs were under attack by Nazism and only
a complete defeat of fascist forces could preserve
democratic way of life.
The New York Post recognized the force of public opinion
in its November 18 editorial "The President Speaks."

The

paper praised Roosevelt for giving "consummate proof that
the questions which trouble all decent democrats are
uppermost in his own mind. " 233
233
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President referred to the deal as a temporary military
arrangement justified because it saved lives.
congratulated the American public, too.

The Post

The paper claimed

the outcry over Darlan proved that public sentiment wanted a
complete destruction of fascist and Nazi ideas.
The pressure by decent, democratic opinion against
Darlan strengthened the President, made it
inevitable that he would break the ice, led us
straight toward this grand moment of
clarification.
Had the American part of the world kept quiet, our
allies everywhere might still be dazed, baffled
and bewildered. The pressure of opinion made a
solution necessary, and it was forthcoming ....
.. . For the benefit of timid officials everywhere:
DOWN WITH DARLAN, as we said on Monday. 234
The Christian Science Monitor, offered tentative support
for the Darlan arrangement in its November 18 editorial
titled "Deals with Darlans."

As justification for the

Darlan Deal, the paper noted Roosevelt's explanation that
the military situation demanded the Allies reach some
understanding with Darlan.

The Allied efforts to secure a

quick surrender were hampered since the Allied choice for
the French leadership, General Giraud, was viewed as a
traitor by the French in North Africa, and since Darlan had
helped install the North African administration.

The need

to negotiate and meet Darlan's demands proved greater than
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the risk of using the American military to prop up a fascist
regime. 235

However, the paper warned its readers not to

trust Darlan.

The admiral may have a hidden purpose behind

his switch to the Allied camp.
More than a doubt remains, of course, as to how
much authority can be entrusted to Darlan. Two
can always play at a game which one may imagine
oneself to the playing alone. There are risks
involved in deals with Darlan
So far the risks would appear to be worth the
taking. Doubtless they have saved both American
and French lives. And the time they have saved
may prove crucial. But even more will have to be
known before anxieties are quite set at rest. For
example, what was Darlan's price? Or has the
ruthlessness of France's conqueror, and the turn
of battle's tide, at last confounded the confusion
that was Vichy? 236
On November 18, the Louisville Courier Journal published
a long editorial, titled "Our Deal With Darlan was a
Military Coup," supporting Eisenhower.

The paper praised

Eisenhower not for negotiating with Darlan, who remained a
Vichy collaborator, but for taking advantage of the
situation.
The Courier Journal bemoaned the divisiveness the Darlan
Deal created among the Allies.

As proof of the

disenchantment of the allied powers, the paper wrote that
the Fighting French were "openly bitter" and the British
235
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House of Commons wanted an explanation of the "most
mysterious chapter of this war and of all countries. " 237

But

the paper claims this outrage was uncalled for; Roosevelt's
explanation that the Darlan Deal was temporary and only
reached for military reasons was the only explanation
needed.
Darlan had much to offer the Allies, the Courier Journal
told its readers.

As Vichy's Defense Minister, the Admiral

could strongly influence other French generals in North
Africa.

Not only could he bring the French army over to the

Allied camp, but he might persuade the French fleet as well.
"Of course, the transaction was not ideal," the paper said,
in order to acknowledge that Darlan was an undesirable
character.

"But wars are not waged according to Hoyle and

any advantage over the enemy is seized.

11238

The Courier Journal claimed to understand the concerns of
the Fighting French.

The group feared being overshadowed by

an American-supported fascist government.

Eisenhower did

not plan to let that happen, the paper told its readers.
Darlan had helped save lives and material, none of which
could be spared, but once his usefulness expired, he would
be thrown away.

The Eisenhower-Darlan Deal "is like our

policy of playing along with Vichy although he recognized it
237
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was a puppet of Hitler.
can get it.

"2

In war you take help wherever you

39

The divisive repercussions to the Darlan affair
are unfortunate in creating a spirit of disunity
in the anti-Axis camp. But the facts should
settle the hullabaloo and the facts seem to be
that Eisenhower acted brilliantly and effectively
for the best interests of the United Nations. 240
On November 19, the New York Post put forward an
editorial that gave an in-depth analysis of Roosevelt's
statement.

In doing so, the paper had abandoned its

opposition and now fully supported the Darlan policy.
Those of us who have been deeply disturbed over
General Eisenhower's collaboration with Darlan-and
we are millions all over the earth-can accept
President Roosevelt's statement on the subject
gratefully and in good faith.
In content and in timing it was a superb
accomplishment of statesmanship. It is an
explanation of a specific occurrence and an
affirmation of principles for our future guidance.
It ranks with and supplements the Atlantic
Charter. 241
Although the paper sounded words of support, it didn't
back off from its position that Darlan could not be trusted.
As proof of the Post's opposition to Darlan, the paper asked
questions designed to highlight the French admiral's
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untrustworthiness.

These questions included: Who is to

determine when Darlan should step down?

What have the

Allies done to prevent Darlan from gaining too much
political power?

Could Darlan still be in power when the

offensive in Europe begins?

Could Darlan switch sides yet

again? 242
The paper stated that answers to those questions needed
to come quickly in order to convince:
the common man of enslaved Europe ... that if and
when we deal with their Darlans or Quislings that
we ... use them for whatever they can contribute in
information, or as decoys, but never as allies. 243
In closing, the Post praised the public for questioning
the North African arrangement, as it did in the previous
day's editorial.

To the paper, the public response

indicated its deep opposition to fascist and totalitarian
regimes:
Frankly, we're delighted that so many people, here
and in England, have shouted their questions ever
since the first word of dealings with Darlan came
out. Consider what it would signify if people
didn't care enough to question transactions with a
double action Quisling. 244
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On the same day, November 19, commentator Johannes Steel
also discussed the Darlan issue in the New York Post.

In

his "Steel Filings" column, the writer claimed that even
though the President had promised that no permanent
arrangement with Darlan had been made, a dangerous precedent
had been established that damaged America's moral authority.
Steel asked readers to consider what the people of Norway
would say if the Allies temporarily appointed Quisling to a
leadership position.
Steel argued that the arrangement with Darlan, even as a
temporary measure, had a profoundly negative psychological
impact.

Allied governments-in-exile must now ask themselves

if the Americans would support local Quislings instead of
the legitimate authorities once their nations were
liberated. 245
It is incontestable that our moral and political
prestige in enslaved Europe has declined in direct
proportion to the tremendous increase in our
military prestige. we have committed one the
worst blunders of the war. 246
Because of the ethical questions the Darlan Deal raised,
Steel continued, the "temporary and limited military
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advantages" achieved through negotiations with Darlan might
not "outweigh the political disadvantages. " 247
The Washington Post proposed to its November 19 readers
that the Americans were in a better position to eliminate
remnants of Vichy with Darlan than they would have been
without him.

In the editorial "Clearing The Air," the Post

stated that Roosevelt supported Eisenhower's agreement with
Darlan because it allowed us "to clinch our military hold on
French North Africa. " 248

Having accomplished that, the

Darlan agreement put America in a position to demand the
abolition of Nazi-influenced laws and demand the release of
political prisoners.

"Accordingly, far from constituting,

as some have argued, an 'appeasement' policy, the efforts
taken by General Eisenhower, in the light of his
information, partook of military statesmanship of the most
realistic and fruitful kind.

11249

The columnist Samuel Grafton, in his November 19 "I'd
Rather Be Right" column, argued that Roosevelt's statement
on Darlan established two important precedents, the first
being that fascists of any stripe eventually would be
rejected by the Allies. 250
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The second precedent that
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Roosevelt established, according to Grafton, was that any
person who supported even a few fascist ideals would be
considered a die-hard opponent of the Four Freedoms.
You have to remember that there are German
Darlans, and Italian Darlans, and Czech Darlans,
and Norwegian Darlans. The Darlan case is rich in
its power to set precedents; it is bursting with
precedents; Darlan's flight is a trial flight for
fascists all over Europe. 251
The statement broke with the long-standing diplomatic
reasoning that the U.S. dealt with a government, even a
fascist government, simply because it had authority.
However, the president promised to remove Darlan from his
position once his usefulness had ended.

This meant that the

Allies would no longer recognize fascist authority.
Authority was granted to individuals through democratic
elections. 252
In its November 19 editorial, "A Faith Reaffirmed," the
Chicago Sun told readers that Roosevelt's statement was
significant because it rejected any long term agreements
with fascists.

In accepting Darlan purely on military terms

and rejecting any long-term political arrangements, the
paper said Roosevelt reaffirmed the American faith in
liberty and democracy.

The Darlan affair also illustrated

the public's recognition that America's opponents, with whom
251
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Darlan collaborated, opposed all that American society
considered good.
As a front-line soldier in the battle for
democracy, Mr. Roosevelt has done what his record
suggested he would do. That he acts with the full
backing of an aroused public opinion is even more
significant. In their distrust of Darlan and
their demands for an explanation, the people have
given good evidence that they fully understand the
difference between a narrow military war and the
kind of war in which we are actually engaged.
They knew Darlan was out of place because they
knew we are fighting not only against certain
nations but against the evil forces of Fascism,
which are not confined within national boundaries.
In such a war the collaborators with Fascism
belong on the Axis side of the lines, not ours. 253
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, which had previously
attacked Darlan's character in no uncertain terms, also
welcomed Roosevelt's statement in "Darlan's Status Is
Cleared Up" on November 19.

The Dispatch claimed that

Roosevelt and Eisenhower knew Darlan's record well.
If the Allied leaders had ignored the opportunity to
secure a surrender through Darlan, the North African
campaign would have been longer and more costly.

"The fact

that Eisenhower accepted this help certainly did not mean
that he was setting up a Vichy regime, American model, in
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North Africa, or that he was attempting to dictate the
future of France," the Dispatch assured readers. 254
After arguing this point, the paper made an astounding
flip-flop of its own.

As proof of his "slimy" character,

the paper had noted on Nov. 18 that Darlan had not abandoned
his fascist loyalties after switching sides. 255

Now, the

Dispatch tried to make apologies for Darlan's fascist

tendencies:
An immediate gain from Mr. Roosevelt's statement
is in quieting the uneasiness of General de
Gaulle's followers. However, acceptance of
Darlan's aid merely follows a principle laid down
some time ago by the Fighting French movement
itself. On Sept. 21, it was announced from London
that Charles Vallin, former vice-president of the
pro-Fascist movement know as Crois de Feu and an
ex-supporter of Petain, had been received into the
De Gaulle organization. This meant, William
Stoneman wrote, that "anybody, no matter what his
party or his political past, will be welcomed to
the ranks of the Fighting French provided only
that he is determined to fight the Germans .... "
Vallin's action will make a deep impression upon
many other former collaborators whose loyalty has
been shaken by recent events.

It was apparently the same line of reasoning that
led to the acceptance of co~operation from Admiral
Darlan for its immediate value in the North
African war. 256
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In its Nov. 19 editorial titled "A 'Temporary
Expedient,'" the New York Herald Tribune claimed Roosevelt's
explanation of the Darlan situation as temporary was exactly
what the public needed to hear.

In praising the president's

explanation, the paper equated Darlan with the Norwegian
Vidkun Quisling who aided the German invasion of his
homeland.

"The idea that we were trafficking with a

Quisling for any reasons other than military necessity seems
to us completely ended by this forthright utterance," the
Herald Tribune said.

The paper felt the reassurance that

the French people were ultimately responsible for the future
French Government would soothe a public upset over an
American government embracing French fascists but remaining
cool toward General de Gaulle.

"The President is to be

congratulated on making this plain, as well as upon making
plain at the same time that no fundamental principles have
been compromised," the paper argued. 257

The paper did not

save its biggest congratulations for the president, however.
Another group claimed that prize:
It seems to us that congratulations are also owing
to the Fighting French representatives who have so
promptly understood and generously accepted the
situation. In this they were only reflecting the
attitude of General de Gaulle himself, who from
the moment of the landing has spoken only as a
French soldier and a French patriot in the noblest
sense. It is an example which will shine only the
257
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brighter through the months against the more
devious obscurities be~ueathed
to us by the
corruptions of Vichy. 25
The Saint Paul Pioneer Press endorsed the EisenhowerDarlan Deal in "Temporary Expedient" on November 19 but it
stopped short of endorsing Darlan.

The Pioneer Press

claimed that President Roosevelt's statement on the affair
"goes a long way to clear up a muddy, bad-tasting and
incipiently dangerous situation."

Since the Darlan Deal

advanced the timetable of American forces in North Africa
perhaps two or three months, it helped prevent the Axis from
launching an organized counter-offensive.
justified the deal.

This alone

The president's refusal to support any

proposed government advanced by Darlan reinforced the
importance of the issues for which the war was fought.
This statement places Darlan where he belongs: A
Vichyard who jumped to Africa to save his own skin
when he saw the handwriting on the wall. It
reveals that he has been used to assist the
military occupation and will be discarded at the
end of his usefulness instead of being allowed to
step back into ~ower on the shoulders of the
United Nations. 59
The Atlanta Constitution threw its weight in favor of the
Darlan Deal in an editorial titled "Forehanded Realism" on
Nov. 20.
258
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the period following Roosevelt's statement of support for
the Eisenhower-Darlan pact.

But Darlan himself was an

unscrupulous individual who could not long be tolerated.
The paper reports that the United States was dealing with a
man of the lowest moral order.

By extension, Darlan

represented the opposite of the ideals for which the Allies
were fighting.
Darlan is a victim of two emotions. One is his
overweening ambition and the other his jealous
hatred of the British. As a French naval officer
he has always been jealous of British naval
supremacy and he has allowed that factor to taint
his entire character and outlook. Add to this his
compelling ambition for personal power and the
man's character begins to be understandable. 260
Chicago Sun writer Frank Smothers in a November 20 column
titled "Mr. Roosevelt's Opportunity" claimed the president's
statement on Darlan helped combat a growing cynicism toward
the U.S. in the world community.

This cynicism was brought

about because of failures, like the Darlan incident, to
prove America's belief in the principles of the Atlantic
Charter.

When the Atlantic Charter was issued, people in

Asia, Europe, and America welcomed the pledge to respect the
right of people to choose their own form of government,
Smothers said.

Roosevelt's statement helped reassure other

nations that the Atlantic Charter still formed the country's
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basic policy.

That being so, Smothers challenged the

president to continue to uphold the principles of the
Atlantic Charter. 261
Having spent most of the last decade in China and
Europe I have learned that no statesman approached
Mr. Roosevelt in the general world confidence he
enjoys as a leader of democracy .... He can do
more for a free Italy, free Spain, free Europe,
free India, free society of nations ... But he can
succeed only if he has the audacity to match his
principles; and only if he acts as the agent of a
people dedicated to freedom. 262
The Des Moines Register argued that the Darlan policy did
not represent appeasement in "Reassurance About Darlan" on
November 20.

Negotiating with "turncoat ex-

collaborationists" did not mean that any principle had been
sacrificed.

Indeed, the United States would not "coldly

ditch all our natural allies. " 263

In other words, Darlan' s

switch to the Allied camp was not caused by ideological
motivations.

His ideas did not fit with those of the Allies

and because of that, he would never be allowed to have a
formative role among the Allies.
No person should look at the Darlan Deal as a political
arrangement, only a military one, the paper said.

To
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support this position,the Register claimed the Darlan Deal
didn't substantially change any of General Eisenhower's
plans.

American policy had been to place General Giraud in

charge of the French North African military forces, the
exact position Giraud received under Darlan.

All Eisenhower

did was use Darlan to improve the Allied military ends. 264
Dorothy Thompson's November 20 "On the Record" column
took issue with Roosevelt's statement because it implied
American administration of the French North African
colonies.

It would be wrong, she wrote, for the president

to restore the French republican constitution by demanding
the repeal of the Nazi inspired laws and the release of Free
French prisoners.

The only legitimate method of restoring

the French Constitution is to restore it in principle. 265
Suppose that the whole U.S. were occupied by Nazis
and Japanese. Suppose that these had found local
Quislings and Lavals, who had abolished the
Constitution and taken over the Administration and
were ruling-and as Laval now is in all of France
but Algeria-by decrees, resting on Nazi-Jap
bayonets. Now suppose that an Anglo-American
expeditionary force had landed in Maine, taken
over the government, and established themselves.
What would they do politically? What call would
they send out to the people of America? Would
they arbitrarily pick an administrator, or would
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they then re-establish the American
Cons ti tut ion?. . . . The analogy is exact. 266
The Chicago Daily Tribune argued the same position as the
Des Moines Register-that Eisenhower did not abandon American
ideals by signing an agreement with Darlan, albeit more
forcibly.

In its November 21 editorial, "The Darlan

Mystery," the Daily Tribune attacked the "bleeding hearts"
who thought the Darlan Deal would "alienate friendship for
us in France ... " 267
entirely wrong.

The paper argued that this assumption is

The French knew the Germans and Italians

coveted French colonies, colonies the Americans would just
as soon leave alone.

The French know that Hitler planned to

dominate France politically and economically and that
America fought in support of self-determination.

Lastly,

the paper argued, the Fighting French knew that they could
never liberate France without American help.

These factors

should put to rest any fears of alienating the Free French
or of splitting the Allied cause by negotiating with Darlan,
even though he may be "the embodiment of wickedness.

11268

Here is evidence that even one of the most adamant
supporters of Eisenhower recognized that Darlan did not
represent democratic virtues.
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stigma that may arise from treating with the enemy, in this
instance, was outweighed by a higher moral position.
If General Eisenhower had not taken advantage of
the opportunity presented to him he would have
been grossly derelict in his duty to his men and a
lot of American mothers and fathers today would be
mourning the loss of their sons. 11269
A letter to the Chicago Sun on November 21 praised the
newspaper for its stand against Darlan.

The writer, who

only identified himself as "Simple Simon," claimed that by
supporting "slimy opportunists and turncoats like Darlan,"
the United States had turned its back on De Gaulle and Free
French, the only French group to continue the fight against
Hitler.

"Now they are being superseded by eleventh-hour

converts who are more interested in getting on the winning
side than in serving their country.

La bas Darlan.

Vive De

Gaulle. " 270

In his November 21 "Steel Filings" column, Johannes Steel
warned that it now appeared that many fascists had been
trying to contact Allied authorities since the Darlan
incident.

To support this claim he pointed to an Associated

Press report from London claiming that German generals were
sending out feelers concerning a strong, de-Nazified Germany
as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the New
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York Times reported an unidentified Washington source as
saying that "If Goering should offer to come over with a few
planes, we don't want him.
contribute.

He will cost more than he will

But it he can bring the Luftwaffe with him

we'll receive him."

Steel wanted to know if this was an

invitation. 271
Steel argues that these events and quotes provide
evidence that Axis leaders now wondered about the Allies'
moral fortitude.

If a deal can be struck with Darlan, why

not Hitler's own military forces?

The only way to combat

this is to publicly refuse any peace with the German General
Staff; 272 to again state the Allied comrni tment to the
absolute destruction of Naziism and it origins.
In fact, the German General Staff is even more
dangerous than Hitler since it is not always
recognized that Pan-German imperialism and
Prussian militarism were precisely the antidemocratic seeds that germinated into the weed of
National Socialism. 273
Samuel Grafton, in his "I'd Rather Be Right" column of
November 21, also warned that the Allies had begun receiving
contacts from fascists.

Grafton pointed out that many of

these people were Vichyites fleeing France to join up with
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Darlan in Africa, but Grafton was more worried about what to
do with fascists once the Allies had them, than what to do
about negotiating with them. 274
We've talked about setting up a commission to try
fascists, after the war, but our idea is to try
them for derivative, or secondary crimes, not for
the big crime of fascism. If M. Laval has never
committed a murder, he would get off, though he
helped to kill a country. 275
Grafton said a commission didn't work at the end of world
war I.

Why try a commission again when it didn't work the

first time?

The columnist's proposal was to let the people

of each liberated country decide the fate of their fascist
citizens.

"The moral strength that will free Europe from

within will render fascism harmless, and our moral fortitude
will not lie in interfering. 11276
Grafton and Steel's columns mark a turning point in the
discussion of Darlan.

Increasingly, the press became

interested in what conditions must be met for Darlan's
removal.

But the media also began discussing the larger

moral issues of how to deal with other Darlans.

As the war

progressed, there would surely be other fascists willing to
switch sides.
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the Allies propose to do with captured fascists?

The Darlan

discussion had evolved into the larger moral issue of how to
deal with fascists so that the Allies' moral authority would
not be compromised, at least in the United States.

The Allied Reaction to Roosevelt's statement
Roosevelt's statement clearly helped calm the American
public.

Although American papers continued to denigrate

Darlan, they now expressed support for the Darlan Deal for
purely military reasons.

In the United Kingdom, however,

strong and vocal criticism continued.
In Parliament, Thomas Horabin attacked the President's
statement the very day it was delivered.

Horabin claimed

that his constituents were bewildered to see the Allies
embrace "one of Hitler's most hated satellites." 277

He asked

how much more bewildered the people of France must be to see
Britain support one of their betrayers.

Horabin said

Roosevelt's statement did nothing to encourage the captive
people of Europe, "because the oppressed peoples no longer
trust words. " 278
principles.
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fascists instead of men who represent freedom, "I suggest
that that way lies disaster for us, " he said. 279
On November 21, the Manchester Guardian, in its editorial
"A New Phase" discussed the feelings of Members of
Parliament on a variety of issues, touched on Roosevelt's
statement on the Darlan issue.
Darlan feelings ran deep ...

"On the recognition of

The House of Commons, like the

rest of the country, dislikes the agreement with Darlan.

It

is only barely satisfied with President Roosevelt's
assurance of its temporary character. " 280
Further evidence of the British public's attitude
appeared on November 23 when a letter to the editor appeared
in the Manchester Guardian responding to the paper's Nov. 18
editorial, "The Darlan Mystery."

The letter takes the paper

to task for equating Darlan with Laval.

Laval had become a

fascist long before 1939 and thus could only be regarded as
an enemy. 281
The case of Darlan is very different. He was the
commander-in-chief of a Navy which had been
fighting as our ally for nine months. In a moment
of our gravest danger he gave the order
withdrawing the support of the French Fleet.
Later, he was solely responsible for withholding
from that fleet the knowledge of the very generous
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terms offered by us for its neutralisation,
thereby causing those lamentable events which
enabled the enemy to drive such a formidable wedge
between the French and English nations. 282
To the writer, Darlan was worse than an enemy, he was a
traitor to the Allied cause.

In 1940, he sought to

accommodate the enemy and dismissed any thought of
continuing the war.

In war fought for ideological reasons,

this meant that Darlan was willing to abandon traditional
French and British ideals for those of the enemy.

It was

too much to expect the admiral to now embrace the beliefs
for which the Allies fought.
The Guardian again attacked Darlan on November 24 in the
editorial "Amnesty."

The paper took exception to an amnesty

announced by the French North African Commission, the body
headed by Darlan, for all persons who had sided with the
Allies during the American invasion.

To the newspaper, it

would have been a greater crime not to support the Allied
action in North Africa.

The fight against the Axis was to

defend a way of life; it was a matter of conscience.
We are apparently to understand that those
Frenchmen who supported us committed a crime for
which they needed to be pardoned. Perhaps we
shall ask Darlan to secure a pardon for General de
Gaulle for the crime of coming to Britain to raise
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a French army to support us, a crime for which the
Vichy Government sentenced him to death. 283
On November 26, a motion condemning the Darlan agreement
was introduced into the House of Commons.
This House is of the opinion that our relations
with Admiral Darlan and his kind are inconsistent
with the ideals for which we entered and are
fighting this war; furthermore, that these
relations, if persisted in, will undermine the
faith in us among our friends in the oppressed and
invaded nations and impair the military, social
and political prospects of the final and complete
triumph of the cause of the United Nations. 284
The threat of this motion proved so real that Prime
Minister Churchill read President Roosevelt's statement to
the House of Commons.

Although the President's statement

succeeded in killing the motion, debate and argument
concerning the Darlan Deal continued. 285
The Russian people, too, seemed shocked by the Darlan
Deal, except for the most important Russian.

Stalin fully

understood the advantages of the Darlan Agreement and
congratulated the British and Americans for taking advantage
of the opportunity the French admiral provided. 286

In his

November 28 letter to Churchill, Stalin directly replied to
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Churchill's November 24 comments on Darlan, "It seems to me
that the Americans used Darlan not badly in order to
facilitate the occupation of the Northern and Western
Africa.

The military diplomacy must be able to use for

military purposes not only Darlan but 'Even the Devil
himself and his grandma' [Stalin quoted from a Russian
proverb] . " 287
Churchill forwarded Stalin's message to Roosevelt,
notifying the President of Stalin's acceptance of the
deal. 288

Stalin later shared his view of the Darlan Deal

with the President personally.

In a December 14 letter to

Roosevelt, the Soviet leader said he felt Eisenhower's
agreement with Darlan was sound military policy.

"I

consider it an important achievement that you have succeeded
in winning Darlan and others to the Allied side against
Hitler, " Stalin wrote. 289
But one other party also had problems with the
President's statement: Darlan.

In a letter to General
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Clark, Darlan complained that "Information from various
sources tends to substantiate the view that I am 'only a
lemon which the Americans will drop after they have squeezed
it dry.' " 290

290
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CHAPTER VI
DARLAN'S FINAL DAYS

Darlan was not quite ready to be "squeezed dry."
Throughout late November and early December, Darlan acted
increasingly like a head of state.

In fact, General

Eisenhower learned on December 3 that Darlan was prepared to
declare himself head of state (since Petain had become a
prisoner of the Germans) and form an Imperial Council,
composed of his top officials, to administer French North
Africa. 291

This announcement proved potentially embarrassing

since it directly violated Roosevelt's policy of nonrecognition of a French Government until after the war.
Eisenhower ordered a stop to the announcement. 292
Eisenhower explained to Darlan that the U.S. could not
be seen recognizing any provisional French government.

The

U.S. only regarded Darlan as the head of a local
administration and not as the French head of state. 293
Darlan got permission to create and head his Imperial
Council, but he had to publish the statement as a "joint
announcement" and to omit "French Imperial Federation" in an
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attempt to derive the announcement of any official
character. 294

Darlan' s final statement read:

An event of far-reaching importance has taken
place: French Africa has been given the official
structure which will enable it, pending the
liberation of Metropolitan France, to defend the
general interests of the Empire, to resume in an
effective way the fight on the side of her allies,
and to represent France in the world ....

The High Commissioner, representing French
sovereignty, and assisted by the services of the
High Commissariat, will henceforth assume the
rights and responsibilities of a government in
every country concerned .... At the side of the
High Commissioner, who represents the French
State, the Imperial Council will, from now on,
represent the various territories of the
Empire ... 295
Despite Eisenhower's attempts to water down Darlan's
statement, the public immediately reacted to the admiral's
broadcast.

In Great Britain, the public outcry caused

Members of Parliament to give voice to their constituents'
feelings.

Many questions were raised against in Parliament

about the Allies' policy toward Darlan.

The Government's

statement did its best to distance itself from the French
admiral's announcement:
Lieut-Col. Elliot asked for an assurance that his
Majesty's Government were in no way committed by
the proclamation made by Admiral Darlan that he
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was assuming responsibility as head of the
Government of Northern Africa.
Mr. Eden-Yes, Sir. His Majesty's Government were
in no way consulted about that statement, and do
not consider themselves in any way bound by it.
(Cheers.) ....
Mr. Shinwell- The right hon. gentleman has said
that His Majesty's Government were not committed
to Admiral Darlan's proclamation. Who is
committed to it? Is it some other Government?
Are we to understand that Admiral Darlan is
himself responsible and no other Government
associated with the united Nations?
Mr. Eden-So far as I know it was a unilateral
inspiration of Admiral Darlan himself.
(Laughter.) 296
The London Times reassured the public that Darlan's
claims to political leadership in North Africa were the
admiral's own invention in its December 7 editorial,
"Admiral Darlan's Status."

In it, the Times told readers

that General Eisenhower "did not do, did not seek to do, and
was not entitled to do" confer a permanent political status
on Darlan.

The only way that political power can be re-

established in any French territory is through free
elections as stated in the Atlantic Charter. 297
The issue here is of far reaching importance. The
eventual re-establishment of regular organs of
government in the countries liberated from the
Nazi terror will obviously raise problems of the
296
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utmost delicacy and complexity. But it is clear
that the decisive voice must come from the peoples
of the countries concerned. 298
A poll conducted by the British Institute of Public
Opinion provided further evidence of the British public's
disapproval of the Darlan Deal.

The survey indicated that

51 percent of those polled disapproved of Darlan becoming
head of the French North African government.

Only 18

percent on the British public expressed approval. 299
Across the Atlantic, the Christian Science Monitor, in
its December 8 editorial "America in Africa" asked whether
Darlan was using the United States to achieve his own ends.
The paper argued that Darlan had only limited use to the
Allies, despite what generals in North Africa might claim.
America should use all its power to remove or discredit
Darlan before he gathered too much power.

Not to do so

threatened to break faith with the Allied public, as well as
the citizens of Europe.
Aside from the practical aspects of the problem
and danger of destroying the hopes and enthusiasm
of the French who are disturbed by the apparent
rewarding of a man who helped Hitler, there is the
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necessity for the Allies to keep faith with their
own ideals and principles. 300
The Monitor even suggested that the U.S. administer
food distribution in North Africa.

Removing that

responsibility from Darlan would weaken his authority
significantly.

"But certainly there should be a limit to

the 'temporary expedient' and the firmest resistance to
Darlan's apparent effort to cement his position by use of
American power.

11301

In other words, remove Darlan before he

caused any more ethical problems for the Allies.
On December 16, another letter to the editor that
condemned Darlan appeared in the New York Post.

The writer,

Lynn Forest, argued that it was well past time for Darlan to
be removed from power in North Africa.

Retaining him not

only hurt relations with Allies, but also went against the
very principles for which the United States had been
founded.
Dear Editor: Our military gains in North Africa
may be obliterated by the grave harm being done
to the cause of human freedom by our continued
acceptance of Darlan.
Darlan Pro-fascist, Vichy mock ruler,
collaborator with the Nazi hordes that stripped
and tortured France! While at the time a deal
with Darlan saved lives, his usefulness is over,
and there is no answer we can make to the
300
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sickened, angry people, who, with the Fighting
French, have starved, suffered and died to wipe
out the shame of a defeat that was not theirs,
but the defeat of men like Darlan .... Americans
tired of tyrants almost two centuries ago. Have
we forgotten ? 302
A letter in the December 19 issue of the New York Post
claimed the Darlan Deal had eliminated any moral reason for
the war.

The author, Joshua Right, argued that Allied war

leaders should not be trusted; the slogans they used to
justify the war had been proved false by the Darlan Deal.
Instead of placing fascists on trial, we "give them the
opportunity to proclaim themselves 'Chief of State,' 'Chief
of the Empire' and other titles of Fascistic coinage.

11303

No, we don't believe in these slogans, as long as
our commanding officers will deal with traitors,
a la Darlan, who rightly belong on the scaffold.
Together with the Fighting French we repeat "What
are we fighting for?" Certainly not Darlan and
his clique. 304
As late as December 23, editorials and letters still
appeared in newspapers attacking Darlan and his political
establishment in North Africa.

The New York Post warned

that until the Americans finally disposed of Darlan, the
U.S. would never live up to its stated war aims.
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its argument on three points: that Darlan had nothing left
to offer the Allies, that the Darlan situation had strained
relations between the U.S. and its British and Free French
allies, and that the Darlan Deal has badly hurt American
public moral.

305

Instead of just dropping Darlan, the paper argued, the
U.S. played a "diplomatic Alice in Wonderland game," holding
relations with Darlan as if he were a sovereign ruler.

The

American government tried to obscure the issue by calling
Darlan a high commissioner instead of head of state and
calling our ambassador to Darlan a "civil affairs
officer.

11306

Ever since Hitler rose to power, the way to make
sure of having to give fascism a lot has been to
try to deal with it cheap. Isn't the Darlan case
another incredible example of this truism. 307
In the same issue of the Post, another contributor
expressed his opinion that retaining Darlan was morally
wrong.

In his letter to the editor, Morel J. Fuchs argued

that Darlan was a fascist and therefore the enemy.
Accepting Darlan for temporary military gain proved to be a
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lie since he failed to bring the French fleet over to the
Allied side.
We are fighting for our way of life and the
continuance of our existence as a great nation.
Would it therefore not be proper at this time to
let our Allies and the enslaved people of the
world know that their enemies are our enemies and
their friends ours?
It is my opinion that Monsieur Darlan ... should be
treated like a prisoner of war, no better nor
worse. 308
Darlan's reign as political chief of French North
Africa did not last long, however.

At 2:30 p.m. on a sunny

Christmas Eve in Algiers, a young man in his 20s arrived at
the southern gate of the Palais d' Ete, the headquarters of
the Imperial Council.

He walked to the nearby Moorish

pavilion, which housed the offices of the High Commissariat
and signed the registry.

A guard admitted the man into the

waiting room where he smoked a cigarette. 309
Shortly after 3 p.m., a car containing Admiral Darlan
drove into the compound.

Darlan and his aide, Captain

Hourcade, promptly proceeded to the Admiral's office.

As

Darlan passed the waiting room on the way to his office, the
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young man drew a gun and shot him twice.

Darlan collapsed

in his off ice doorway. 310
Hourcade grabbed the man about the throat and wrist.
As the man tried to free himself from Hourcade's grip, the
gun went off again, grazing the Captain's cheek.

Hourcade

released the man and the assassin took aim at Hourcade's
stomach and fired.

Hourcade tried to Jump out of the

bullet's path, but the bullet entered his thigh. 311
By this time several guards had arrived in the waiting
room.

As the assassin attempted to flee through a window,

one guard grabbed the assassin while another guard used a
chair to knock the gun out of his hand. 312
While the guards struggled with the assassin, three of
Darlan's administrators emerged from the nearby offices to
tend to the Admiral.

Darlan lay with his eyes open,

bleeding from the mouth. 313

A rear admiral and a sailor

carried Darlan to a car and drove him to the hospital which
was treating his son, Alain. 314

Darlan was conscious

throughout the drive, but unable to speak due to his wounds.
Twenty minutes later, at the hospital, a surgeon pronounced
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him dead.

The bullets had punctured his liver and

intestines.
When the news of Darlan's assassination reached the
United States, the press overwhelming condemned the murder.
The Allied cause was not about eliminating political
opponents but about restoring political pluralism.

For all

their criticism of the Darlan Deal and abuse of Admiral
Darlan himself, most newspapers claimed the assassination
solved nothing.

Yet they saw in Darlan's death an

opportunity to unite the various French factions on the
Allied side and any Vichy remnants.
The Washington Post expressed this exact sentiment on
December 26.

In the editorial "Exit Darlan," the Post

assured readers that despite Darlan's switch to the Allied
side, his administration in North Africa continued Vichy
policies.

For instance, the paper said, Darlan eased

censorship rules and restrictions on communication only
shortly before his death, and probably at Eisenhower's
insistence.

However, the Post said, the removal of this

fascist-leaning Frenchmen provides an opportunity:
The assassination of Darlan removes a man with
whom the kind of Frenchmen who never lost their
faith in France could not collaborate. But on the
council in North Africa, there are many Frenchmen
who believe in France, who would die for her, who
have given many sacrifices in her behalf. These
are the sort of men who might-and could-hoist a
French standard which would be worthy in the sight
of the free world and of the Free French. There
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was no such standard in North Africa when Darlan
was high commissioner. 315
The Christian Science Monitor expressed similar
beliefs.

In the paper's December 26 editorial, "Darlan-Not

a Solution," the Christian Science Monitor argued that the
most pressing problem caused by the Darlan murder was the
choice of successor.

When Darlan lived, he claimed to

derive his authority from Marshall Petain, which forced many
"loyal but legal-minded French officers" from supporting
other French leaders.

After Darlan's assassination, the

paper said, two or three Frenchmen existed who could become
his legitimate successor.

The choice of successor provides

"a new opportunity to work out solutions of internal
differences which were bound to exist until the nature of
Darlan' s role could be ascertained.

11316

The New York Times also stressed French unity in its
December 26 editorial.

In "The End of Darlan," the Times

provided readers with a brief biography of Darlan's life and
the rationales behind the Darlan Deal.

Chiefly, that only

Darlan had the authority to order an end to French
resistance to the Allied landings.

Darlan's death raised

the problem of who could claim that authority.
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What is most important is to secure the French
leadership most likely to be accepted, most likely
to make for unity rather than division in the
French North African civil population and armed
forces. 317
On December 27, an editorial cartoon, titled "Smoke
from a Little Pistol," (see Figure 1) appeared in the
Baltimore Sun. 318

Like the editorials from the previous

days, it too expressed concern that Darlan's assassination
would create a power struggle in North Africa for the
leadership of the anti-Axis French movement.
Figure 1: Smoke from a Little Pistol
. ·smoke Prom A Little Pistol
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These issues of succession were, in fact, being
considered in North Africa.

If another Vichyite was

selected to lead the Imperial Council, the Americans would
again be accused of supporting a pro-fascist government and
cutting deals with the enemy.

Darlan's Deputy High

Commissioner had been General Jean Marie Bergeret.

Bergeret

produced an ordinance, dated December 2, in which Darlan had
named General Nogues his successor should the admiral be
temporarily incapacitated.

Should Darlan be unable to serve

as High Commissioner, the Imperial Council was to meet and
elect a successor. 319
In an effort to determine the mood of the Imperial
Council, Murphy visited Bergeret on Christmas Day and
discovered that the Deputy High Commissioner favored Nogues.
Murphy told Bergeret that the American public would oppose
Nogues.

"Giraud is very popular in the United States,"

Murphy said. 320
At this point, Giraud had no knowledge of the American
efforts on his behalf; he had been leading the French forces
in Tunisia.

When he arrived back in Algiers for the meeting

of the Imperial Council, he was immediately summoned to meet
with General Clark.

At that meeting, Clark informed Giraud

that Eisenhower "considered it necessary that he immediately
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take over the functions of High Commissioner. " 321

Although

Giraud at first claimed that he only wanted a military
command, he quickly changed his mind.

At noon on December

26, the Imperial Council met and unanimously elected Giraud
High Commissioner.
As High Commissioner, Giraud inherited the task of
investigating Darlan's murder.

The assassin, it was soon

discovered was a 20-year old French royalist named Bonnier
de la Chapelle. 322

De la Chapelle was involved with an anti-

Nazi group of five other young Frenchmen that a Free French
organizer had helped form in Algiers. 323
The group originally planned to assassinate Darlan
while in his car.

A car driven by one of the French

conspirators would take out Darlan's motorcycle escort.
Another car would drive up beside Darlan's car and spray the
car with gunfire.

The plan was dropped because it involved

too many people, and it was decided to send someone to
Darlan's office and assassinate him there.

The four

Royalists then drew lots to determine which one of them
would perform the murder.

De la Chapelle won the drawing. 324

After the assassination, the Count of Paris, the
pretender to the French throne, arrived to speak with
321
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General Giraud.

The Count proposed his own nomination as

head of the Imperial Council on the grounds that he might
bring French unity.
nomination.

Giraud refused to forward the Count's

Soon afterwards, the Count returned to his home

in Spanish Morocco.

The Royalist plot had failed. 325

This placed de la Chapelle in a dangerous position.
Although he expected to become a national hero, Giraud had
him executed by a firing squad two days after the
assassination. 326

Clearly, de la Chapelle expected to be

saved as he talked to the police about his plans to pursue a
diplomatic career.

De la Chapelle had told police that he

had acted alone in the assassination plot.

When the plot to

bring about a de facto restoration of the French monarchy
had failed, de la Chapelle had became a liability.

No

sympathetic Frenchmen or fellow royalist conspirator dared
step forward to save the man's life. 327
Even so, the police arrested 14 men in connection with
the assassination plot.

Many of those arrested had been

among the pro-Allied sympathizers who helped the U.S.
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landing forces come ashore on November 8. 328

Four of the men

arrested were high North African officials appointed by
Darlan.

Their charges included neglect and plotting to

establish a new French government.

These arrests proved to

an attempt by pro-Vichy authorities to round up the major
Allied sympathizers in Algiers.
cleared.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

On the evening of January 14, 1943, a C-54 transport
plane carrying President Roosevelt landed at the Casablanca
airfield.

Casablanca had been chosen as the scene for the

next meeting of the leaders of the Allied movement.
Roosevelt had come there ostensively to meet with Churchill
(who had arrived on January 12) in order to plan the next
stages of the war. 329

(

Stalin did not travel to the

conference, arguing that he could not leave his headquarters
for even a few days. ) 330

In reality, Roosevelt planned to

use the conference to deal with another issue.

Although

Darlan had died in December, the issues which he had come to
symbolize persisted.
If the Americans might make a deal with Darlan, who had
served as prime minister in the fascist Vichy government,
might the Americans also try to deal with the King of Italy,
who had sanctioned Benito Mussolini's fascist government for
twenty years?

Would the Allies be open to receiving more

turncoat fascists?

Could these men survive to play a role

in post-war European governments?
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these issues than in North Africa, where the entire Darlan
controversy first arose.
The Casablanca Conference also seemed an ideal
opportunity to end the feuding between the various French
factions which had formed after the Darlan Deal.

This would

help quiet those critics who claimed that the deal
essentially provided recognition of a fascist group at the
expense of friendly and anti-fascist Free French movement.
Darlan's assassination and Giraud's ascension as his
successor now made a solution to this criticism look
possible.
As previously noted, Giraud was well liked in the
United States.

He had a long record of fighting the

Germans; he had refused any position in the Vichy
government; and he had assisted the United States action in
North Africa.

Although he had cooperated in Darlan's North

Africa government and succeeded Darlan as its head, Giraud's
previous record allowed him to escape any fascist taint.
Roosevelt could use Giraud's ascension as High Commissioner
in North Africa, as opposed to an overt Vichy figure, as
evidence of the United States' commitment to defeating
fascism.

A reconciliation between General de Gaulle's Free

French movement and Giraud's North African administration
could provide further evidence of that commitment.
However, Giraud and de Gaulle's meeting at Casablanca
proved a spectacular failure.

Nobody came away from the
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Casablanca Conference believing that a unified French
resistance was about to be formed.

Giraud had come to

Casablanca expecting that he would leave as the leader of
the Free French.

De Gaulle had come to Casablanca only

after Churchill had threatened to withdraw British funding
for the Free French. 331

Once at Casablanca, de Gaulle

insisted that the Free French represented all of France
while Giraud only represented the brand of fascism embraced
by Darlan. 332

Although Roosevelt and Churchill attempted to

get the two to form a unified command structure, neither
French general was willing to grant anything to the other. 333
The animosity between the two men was obvious at a joint
British-American press conference on January 24.

The two

French generals agreed to shake hands, but neither man
appeared happy. 334
The discord between the various French camps failed to
reassure the American public that the Darlan Deal had not
been made at the sacrifice of our allies.

If Roosevelt and

Churchill intended to bury Darlan once and for all, that
also meant that they had to state that no more deals with
former enemy agents would be made.
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Roosevelt made this
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statement soon after the two bickering French generals had
left the press conference.
Peace can come to the world only by the total
elimination of German and Japanese war power ...
The elimination of German, Japanese, and Italian
war power means the unconditional surrender by
Germany, Italy, and Japan. That means a
reasonable assurance of future world peace. It
does not mean the destruction of the population of
Germany, Italy, and Japan, but it does mean the
destruction of the philosophies in those countries
which are based on conquest and the subjugation of
other people. 335
The unconditional surrender doctrine had a history
independent of the Darlan affair.

In fact, discussions on

unconditional surrender had begun after the Americans
entered the war.

The U.S. State Department's Subcommittee

on Security Problems considered unconditional surrender as
early as April, 1942.

The subcommittee-composed of members

of the State, Army, and Navy-claimed that the U.S. was only
at war because Germans believed their armed forces had been
betrayed by the German political leaders at the end of World
War I.

The subcommittee recommended "On the assumption that

the victory of the United Nations will be conclusive,
unconditional surrender rather than an armistice should be
sought from the principal enemy states except perhaps
Italy.
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The subcommittee's chair, Norman Davis, who had
previously served as an ambassador-at-large and was good
friends with Secretary of State Hull, brought the
subcommittee's findings to the President. 337

Churchill, in

turn, was told of Roosevelt's support of the policy by
August 1942, months before the North African landings. 338
The President clearly committed himself to the unconditional
surrender policy.

On December 2, 1942, Roosevelt told

General Wladislaw Sikorski, head of the Polish governmentin-exile, that "We have no intention of concluding this war
with any kind of armistice or treaty.
surrender unconditionally.

Germany must

11339

Yet despite the long-term consideration of the
unconditional surrender policy, Churchill claimed he was
surprised by Roosevelt's statement.

Clearly the Prime

Minister's surprise could not have been over the
announcement of such a policy because the two men had
discussed the issue during the conference. 340

Roosevelt had

told Churchill that he favored such policy and was thinking
of making a public statement.

Churchill, for his part, sent

a message to his war Cabinet:
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We propose to draw up a statement of the work of
the conference for communication to the press at
the proper time. I should be glad to know what
the war Cabinet would think of our including in
this statement a declaration of the firm intention
of the United States and the British Empire to
continue the war relentlessly until we have
brought about the "unconditional surrender" of
Germany and Japan. The omission of Italy would be
to encourage a break-up there. 341
The War Cabinet responded favorably to the policy, but
asked that Italy be included under the policy.

However,

Churchill and Roosevelt did not return to the topic after
their initial discussion.

Neither man brought up the issue

when reviewing the contents of the joint statement intended
for release at the end of the conference. 342
So why was Churchill surprised by Roosevelt's
announcement of the unconditional surrender pledge?

The

Prime Minister had known of the American's preference for
the policy for months.

Only a short time before, the

President had told Churchill that he was thinking of
publicly discussing the policy.

But the details of the

unconditional surrender policy had yet to be formalized.
Churchill had yet to inform Roosevelt of the British
Government's opinion nor had the President sought out the
British response.

Churchill must have thought the matter

would be taken up at some latter date.
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So the real question becomes not why the unconditional
surrender policy was formed, but why did Roosevelt choose to
make a public statement at the time he did.

Clearly,

Roosevelt wished to reassure Stalin and the Soviet Union
that the United States and the United Kingdom intended to
remain in the war until its end, especially since it was now
clear that the Western Allies would not attempt to open a
second front in Europe in 1943. 343

Earlier in the

conference, Marshall had argued against a major operation in
Europe, preferring to put off any full-scale invasion until
1944, but he supported Eisenhower's proposal to invade
Sicily or Sardinia once the Germans and Italians in Tunisia
had been defeated.

Churchill also advocated an invasion of

Italy, feeling that only a move into Europe could pacify the
soviets. 344
Immediately after the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt
sent Marshall to Moscow in order to discuss the delay in
opening a second front with Stalin.

Roosevelt wanted to

reassure Stalin that the Western Allies had no intention of
reaching a type of "Darlan Agreement" with pro-fascist,
German elements that would allow the Germans to continue to
wage war against the Russians. 345
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Bearing these factors in mind, Roosevelt may have made
the unconditional surrender pledge as a way to reassure the
Soviets that the United States and the United Kingdom were
committed to the war.

But as already noted, Stalin

recognized the strategic advantage of using Darlan and
didn't see Eisenhower's agreement with the French Admiral as
hurting the Soviet position.

Moreover, Stalin had stated

this exact position to both Roosevelt and Churchill.

The

President had little reason to think that Stalin had
misinterpreted the reasons for the Darlan Agreement.
Roosevelt no doubt understood the foreign policy advantages
of the unconditional surrender policy, but the statement had
stronger domestic advantages.
The public commentary on the Darlan Deal had continued
for over three months in both the United States and the
United Kingdom.

While the American public may have

eventually accepted the Darlan Deal for its strategic
reasons of saving lives and saving time, it was clear that
many felt it violated the spirit of the Four Freedoms speech
and the Atlantic Charter.

By demanding unconditional

surrender, Roosevelt was able to reclaim the moral high
ground.
It may have been the President's desire to restore the
moral justification for the war that led him to leave
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in Washington.

When

Churchill suggested bringing Anthony Eden, the British
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Foreign Secretary, with him to Casablanca, Roosevelt
objected because he didn't want to bring Hull.

The

Secretary of State had rigid ideas and would be a nuisance
Roosevelt said.

Specifically, Hull opposed unconditional

surrender and was closely identified with the Darlan Deal.
Hull's presence at Casablanca would have made Darlan
transparent. 346
In fact, Roosevelt linked his decision to announce the
unconditional surrender pledge with Darlan and the North
African political situation on several occasions, albeit
indirectly.

Once, when recalling the announcement, the

President said:
We had so much trouble getting those two French
generals together [de Gaulle and Giraud] that I
thought to myself that this was as difficult as
arranging the meeting of Grant and Lee-and then
suddenly the press conference was on, and Winston
and I had no time to prepare for it, and the
thought popped into my mind that they had called
Grant 'Old Unconditional Surrender' and the next
thing I knew, I had said it. 3 n
The meeting between de Gaulle and Giraud represented
the first meeting of the Free French and Darlanist French
elements.

The unconditional surrender doctrine helped

prevent future agreements like the one which created
competing French organizations in the Allied camp.
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this by establishing three main points.

These points

included developing "confidence and a sense of solidarity
among the united Nations," making it clear that no
compromise peace with the Nazis would take place, and
refusing to accept any post-war fascist regime. 348
These points, as embodied in the unconditional
surrender policy, directly dealt with the major public
concerns that came out of the Darlan Deal.

By encouraging a

sense of solidarity among the Allies, Roosevelt dealt with
the criticism that the United States had abandoned the
Fighting French by entering into the Darlan Deal.

The

announcement of unconditional surrender reiterated the
Allies' commitment to defeating fascism.
The President discussed this point and linked it to the
Darlan Deal in his February 12, 1943 radio address about the
Casablanca Conference.

Roosevelt cautioned that Axis

propaganda sought to divide the united Nations by claiming
that the Soviet union, the United Kingdom, the united
States, and China would all go to war against one another
after Germany was defeated.
This is their [the Axis nations] final effort to
turn one nation against another, in the vain hope
that they may settle with one or two at a
time-that any of us may be so gullible and so
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forgetful as to be duped into making "deals" at
the expense of our Allies. 349
Besides reassuring the public that there would be no
more Darlan Deals, Roosevelt also strengthened the position
of his British ally.

Darlan's position in North Africa had

created an even greater uproar in Great Britain than in the
United States.

Not only was the deal criticized in the

British press, but also in Parliament.

Churchill was forced

to give several statements in the House of Commons in secret
session.

It was clear from these sessions that sentiment in

the Commons opposed the Darlan Deal.

If Churchill came

under severe criticism for one Darlan Deal another might
threaten his position as prime minister.

Churchill's

predecessor had been forced from office shortly before the
fall of France.

By making the unconditional surrender

pledge, Roosevelt established policy that prevented any
future deals with men of Darlan's ilk.
By rejecting any compromise peace, the President dealt
with the fear that the United States might be willing to
deal with Hitler and Mussolini as it had dealt with Darlan.
This fear had its roots in the Americans' world War I
experiences.

At the end of World war I certain segments of

the American public argued that Germany should be forced to
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surrender.

The adherents of this position included General

George Pershing, head of the World war I American forces in
Europe, and Congressional Republicans.

Despite this

sentiment, President Wilson's administration, which included
Roosevelt, joined an armistice with Germany. 350
The lack of a German surrender helped create the belief
that the German army had never been defeated.

Instead, the

German army had been stabbed in the back by the new
democratic German government that had come into being after
the war.

Hitler and Nazis had used this belief to discredit

democratic institutions, argue that the post-war settlement
had unfairly singled out Germany, and rebuild the German
military. 351
To the American public, the Darlan Deal raised the
shadow of the World War I Armistice.

Instead of forcing the

enemy to acknowledge its defeat and discredit its
institutions, the Allies seemed to be creating a formula for
the fascism to survive the war and pose a future threat.
Roosevelt wanted to avoid this at all costs.
Roosevelt's third objective was the total elimination
of Nazism.

Since fascism was presented as the moral

opposite of democracy, some sort of reckoning had to take
place.

A complete battlefield defeat would help discredit

350

weinberg,

351

Ibid. , 43 9.

A

world

At Arms,

438-439.
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Nazi and fascism philosophies but, as Roosevelt stated in
his February 12 radio address, he wanted to ensure that the
fascist humiliation ran so deep that democratic governments
replaced fascist regimes:
In our uncompromising policy we mean no harm to
the common people of the Axis nations. But we do
mean to impose punishment and retribution in full
upon their guilty, barbaric leaders ...
In the years of the American and French
revolutions the fundamental principle guiding our
democracies was established. The cornerstone of
our whole democratic edifice was the principle
that from the people and the people alone flows
the authority of government.
It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the
Atlantic Charter, that the conquered populations
of today be again the masters of their destiny.
There must be no doubt anywhere that it is the
unalterable purpose of the United Nations to
restore to conquered peoples their sacred
rights. 352
With the announcement of the unconditional surrender
pledge, the Western Allies were able to put the Darlan Deal
behind them.

Although Roosevelt did not expect the public

outcry which resulted from Eisenhower's agreement with
Darlan, it was a predictable consequence of the President's
statements depicting World War II as a moral struggle.

To

gain public support for his pro-Allied policies, Roosevelt
had expressed American foreign policy in terms of the Four
Freedoms speech and the Atlantic Charter.

352

Roosevelt, "Radio Address."

These documents
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claimed that the fascist philosophy constituted a direct
threat to the American lifestyle and committed the United
States to restoring democratic governments and human rights
to nations ruled by fascist governments.
When General Eisenhower agreed to recognize Admiral
Darlan's authority in French North Africa, it seemed that
the United States' previous statements of policy and the
moral imperative of the war had been abandoned.

Instead of

fighting to eliminate fascism, the United States was
allowing the Vichy fascist government to retain its power in
American occupied territory with a fascist cabinet member
(Darlan) at its head.
The public's outrage over this situation expressed
itself in newspaper editorials, letters to the editor, and
statements of opposition in national legislatures.

Several

times the President attempted to quiet the national outrage.
However, only the unconditional surrender pledge directly
addressed the issues raised by the Darlan Deal and restored
the moral principles for which the war was fought.
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